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Six Years On and Still Counting:  
Sifting Through the Mortgage Mess 
Robert Hockett*
 
 
Six years after reaching their bubble-era peaks and then plunging, U.S. 
primary and secondary real estate and mortgage markets remain one of the 
principal drags upon economic recovery.  As many as 12 million new 
mortgages face foreclosure in the coming six years, assuming no further price 
declines—which cannot be safely assumed owing to symbiotic linkages 
between home prices and macroeconomic performance.  Why do we remain 
in self-perpetuating slump?  The answer is exceedingly complex thanks to 
the large number of causal factors in play.  This Article catalogues and 
imposes order upon these mutually interacting factors by first identifying the 
principal interests at stake and the principal constituencies that hold these 
interests.  The Article then identifies an overlapping convergence of interests 
among most constituencies.  The Article then proceeds to identify all of the 
principal impediments to satisfaction of the convergent interests identified.  
It finds that the most important impediments are rooted in collective action 
challenges that authorized collective agents could surmount.  Next, the 
Article identifies and assesses alternative means that collective agents can 
employ to remove the mentioned impediments.  The principal conclusion 
reached is that municipalities exercising their eminent domain powers in 
partnership with investors are best situated to move the nation out of its 
ongoing mortgage mess. 
 
* Professor of Enterprise-Organizational, Finance-Regulatory, and International 
Economic Law, Cornell Law School; Resident Scholar, Federal Reserve Bank of New York; 
Fellow, The Century Foundation; LL.M., J.S.D., Yale Law School; M.A., Oxford University; 
B.A., J.D., University of Kansas.  Many thanks to Dan Alpert, Neil Buchannan, Michael 
Campbell, Mike Dorf, Robert Frank, Laurie Goodman, Howell Jackson, Lynn Lopucki, Nouriel 
Roubini, Sherle Schweninger, David Skeel, Lynn Stout, Bob Summers, Joe Tracey, John 
Vlahoplus, and participants in workshops held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, The 
Century Foundation, and the New America Foundation. Opinions, errors, and the like are all 
for present purposes my own. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION: THERE MUST BE SOME KIND OF 
WAY OUT OF HERE1
 
 
Six years after reaching their bubble year peaks and then 
plunging, U.S. primary and secondary mortgage and real estate 
markets remain one of the principal drags upon economic recovery.2  
Notwithstanding signs of improvement in some localities, the S&P 
Case Shiller 20 City Index shows home prices down 7.5 percent from 
their previous post-bubble high, itself low in relation to trend, 
reached in May of 2010.3  Meanwhile a backlog of nearly 400,000 
homes awaited liquidation at the end of 2011, with another 2.86 
million mortgages 12 or more months delinquent.4
In light of these trends, real estate analysts estimate that between 
7.4 million and 9.4 million additional home loans are now in danger of 
default over the next six years—an impending foreclosure tsunami of 
unprecedented proportion.
  The upshot is a 
current “shadow inventory” of some 3.25 million homes either 
already foreclosed or on the brink of foreclosure—an inventory that 
weighs heavily on home prices, families, and the nation’s economy 
alike. 
5
Owing to feedback effects, however, further price declines 
cannot realistically be assumed away.
  This assumes no further price declines or 
interest rate rises. 
6
 
 1. With warm thanks and apologies to the bard, Robert Zimmerman, for a most evocative 
bit of poetry of the ensuing couple of lines: “There must be some kind of way out of here, / said 
the joker to the thief, / There’s too much confusion; / I can’t get no relief.”  I hope both that I 
am neither joker nor thief.  Bob Dylan, “All Along the Watchtower” (Columbia Records 1967). 
  Homeowners who live under 
 2. See, e.g., Robert Hockett, Daniel Alpert & Nouriel Roubini, The Way Forward: 
Moving Past the Post-Bubble, Post-Best Economy to Renewed Growth and Competitiveness, 
CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES (Jan. 12, 2012), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=1987139.  See also FED. RESERVE 
BOARD, The U.S. Housing Market: Current Conditions and Policy Considerations, Jan. 4, 2012, 
available at www.federalreserve.gov/ publications/other-reports/files/housing-white-paper-
20120104.pdf; Robert Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1213 (2010) 
[hereinafter Hockett I]; Robert Hockett, Bail-Outs, Buy-Ins, and Ballyhoo, 52 CHALLENGE 36 
(2009) [hereinafter Hockett II]. 
 3. See, e.g., FED. RESERVE BOARD, supra note 2, at 3.  See also William C. Dudley, 
Housing and the Economic Recovery, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. (Jan. 6, 2012), 
www.newyorkfed.org/ newsevents/speeches/2012/dud120106.html. 
 4. See, e.g., Laurie Goodman et al., The Case for Principal Reductions, 17 J. STRUC. FIN. 
29 (2011).  See also Gus Lubin, Laurie Goodman on Why Another 11 Million Mortgages Will 
Go Bad, BUS. INSIDER (July 26, 2011), www.articles.businessinsider.com/2011-0726/markets/ 
30092548_ 1_shadow-inventory-default-rates-loans. 
 5. See, e.g., Goodman et al., supra note 4; Lubin, supra note 4. 
 6. See, e.g., Alpert, Hockett & Roubini, supra note 2; FED. RESERVE BOARD, supra note 
2; Dudley, supra note 3 for support of the claims made in this paragraph.  For more on feedback 
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debt overhang usually don’t spend money, which slows growth.  
Because homes represent the largest store of wealth for the American 
middle class, and because the middle class represents the greatest 
source of American consumer demand, this drag on the economy is 
massive.  Our foreclosure tsunami is accordingly apt to prove self-
worsening.  Mass foreclosures depress home prices, which depress 
consumer expenditures, which depress employment and income, 
which heighten the incidence of default and foreclosure, which 
depresses home prices yet further. 
Certainly, Congress, the Obama Administration, the Federal 
Reserve, and multiple U.S. states have tried multiple programs both 
to keep families in their homes and to hasten a return to full health in 
the mortgage markets and the broader U.S. economy.7
This Article aims to catalogue and impose order upon the large 
number of mutually interacting factors now underwriting continued 
uncertainty and slump in the mortgage markets.  Doing so will serve 
to render this tangled problem both more tractable and, therefore, 
more soluble.  Sorting out the distinct but interacting challenges and 
tracing their interactions should enable us better to map out distinct 
but complementary solution strategies responsive to each distinct 
factor. 
  Why, then, 
are we still in slump?  The answer is exceedingly complex due to the 
large numbers of causal factors in play. 
Part II of the Article identifies the principal interests at stake in 
the mortgage market troubles, as well as the principal constituencies 
that hold these interests.  That assists both normative and political 
feasibility analysis of alternative solutions.  Part III identifies an 
overlapping convergence of interests among most constituencies, 
including the public.  That affords hope that a politically feasible 
solution that benefits all or near all can indeed be developed.  Part IV 
identifies the principal impediments to mortgage market recovery.  
Part V identifies and assesses alternative means by which to remove 
or diminish the mentioned impediments.  A Conclusion then looks 
ahead to next steps, while an Appendix summarizes the Article’s 
principal factor and causal-relational findings in schematic, 
“flowchart” form.   
In view of the disproportionate importance of coordination and 
collective action challenges in blocking progress in solving the 
 
effects of the sort that figure prominently in this Article—a sort that I label “recursive collective 
action problems,” see Robert Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the author); Robert Hockett, Bretton Woods 1.0: An Essay in 
Constructive Retrieval (Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers, Working Paper No. 82, 2011). 
 7. For details of these and other programs, see Alpert, Hockett & Roubini, supra note 2; 
FED. RESERVE BOARD, supra note 2; Dudley, supra note 3. 
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mortgage crisis thus far, the Article concludes that what it calls 
“controlling mortgage bloc assembly” presents the most important 
next step.  That is a step which the Author has urged upon federal 
instrumentalities since 2008, but which is most likely now to be taken 
by municipalities exercising their eminent domain power in 
partnership with investors. 
 
II.  INTERESTS AND CONSTITUENCIES 
 
To remain clear about what is at stake and politically feasible as 
we sift through the mortgage mess, this part identifies seven principal 
interests and five constituencies to consider.   
 
A.  INTERESTS 
1.  Maximization of Mortgage Loan Value Received, Ideally Up to 
the Full Amounts Owed, and of the Value of Underlying Collateral  
 
Mortgage loans are contractual in character, and lenders expect 
and desire to receive all or as close as possible to what they are 
contractually owed, with well-preserved collateral-mortgaged homes, 
serving as backup.  In ordinary times, most borrowers do pay what 
they owe, and so lenders need not resort to foreclosure on collateral.  
The present time is not ordinary, however, and lenders accordingly 
hope to receive as close to what they are owed as possible, in the form 
either of payment, of attached collateral, or both.  This is true 
whether we speak of lenders in primary and secondary markets, or 
about the first lien or second lien holders.8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8. Lenders in “primary” markets are those who hold repayment rights on loans that they 
have originated and held.  Lenders in “secondary” markets—including the markets for 
securitized mortgages and associated mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”)—are those who have 
acquired repayment rights from primary lenders.  “First” lien holders are creditors with priority 
over other rights-holders to payments made by borrowers.  “Second” lien holders are creditors 
lacking in such priority.  Creditors with distinct priorities, notoriously, face collective action 
problems in the vicinity of borrower insolvency.  That fact will prove important below, and so 
will the collective action challenges faced by first lien holders when loans are pooled and 
scrutinized.  Take “interest” to mean legitimate interest throughout. 
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2.  Maximization of Mortgage Loan Value Remitted, Ideally Up to 
the Full Amounts Owed, and of the Value of Underlying Collateral  
While this interest is materially identical to interest II.A.1,9 we 
consider it here from the borrower’s rather than the lender’s point of 
view.10
Borrowers generally wish to pay all or as close as possible to 
what they owe
  In some settings, borrowers’ and lenders’ points of view can 
diverge, though they do not always diverge in the degree or manner 
that some might suppose in the present environment. 
11, as well as to preserve the values of the homes that 
they purchase with borrowed funds.  Presently, however, where many 
borrowers are unemployed or under-employed and many homes are 
market-valued at less than what borrowers owe, mortgagors hope to 
pay less than the face values of their loans.  Most realistically minded 
lenders would be content with that, too.12
 
 
3.  Expedition of Fair, Efficient, and Reliable Mortgage Loan 
Foreclosure, Collateral-Attachment, and Collateral-Sale Proceedings:  
“Expeditious Mortgage Loan Foreclosure Proceedings” 
Ordinarily, nobody wishes to see lenders attach and foreclose on 
the collateral securing borrowers’ obligations on a mass scale.  
Lenders are in the business of lending and investing, not home or 
other collateral-maintaining or selling.  When mass foreclosure is 
unavoidable, there is a presumable interest that proceedings proceed 
fairly and efficiently.13
Notwithstanding that fact, there can be substantial disagreement 
over when indeed “unavoidability” kicks in.  In this connection, one 
prospect that emerges below is that many seemingly unavoidable 
foreclosures are in fact theoretically avoidable, in manners that satisfy 
   
 
 9. Interests II.A.1. and II.A.2. are satisfied by the same actions, and thus materially 
equivalent. 
 10. See also Interest II.A.7., infra, which concerns retention of homes by their purchasers. 
 11. A wish not to repay the loan amount is not a cognizable interest for legal or policy 
purposes and because the general reliability of debt contracts is in the interest of all as it keeps 
down borrowing costs. 
 12. The fact that it is not happening notwithstanding this desire suggests formidable 
coordination and collective action problems, a suggestion that we shall find corroborated below. 
 13. Criminals, sociopaths, and some orthodox welfare economists may argue that no one 
who benefits by unfairness has an interest in fairness, just as they may argue that borrowers do 
not have an interest in paying back their debts.  But to treat others unfairly is not cognizable as 
interests for purposes of legal or public policy analysis, any more than are the “interests” of 
criminals in avoiding prosecution.  See Robert Hockett, Pareto versus Welfare (Cornell Law 
Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-031, 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1309699.  See also Robert 
Hockett, Why Paretians Can’t Prescribe: Preferences, Principles, and Imperatives in Law and 
Policy, 18 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 391 (2009).   
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both interests II.A.1. and II.A.2., if only certain coordination and 
collective action problems that now afflict the primary and secondary 
mortgage markets can be collectively addressed.  That fact will figure 
prominently in the proposals laid out in Part V.  
 
4.  Minimization of Transaction Costs Occasioned By Mortgage 
Finance, Refinance, and Foreclosure Arrangements 
All transactions occasion costs.  Transacting parties generally 
prefer to minimize such costs.  Where the transaction costs are fees 
paid to various “service” providers, on the other hand, some parties 
prefer that they be maximized.  That fact as well figures importantly 
below. 
 
5.  Maintenance of Safety, Soundness, Fairness, Efficiency, Health 
and Stability of U.S. and Global Financial Institutions and Markets, 
Hence of the Residential Mortgage Backed Securities Markets: 
“Maintenance of the Health of the U.S. and Global Financial 
Markets” 
Since the mid-1990s at latest, residential mortgage-backed 
securities (“RMBS”) have come to constitute a very large segment of 
the U.S. and indeed global securities markets.14
But this means that RMBS also implicate the long recognized 
interest in safety, soundness, fairness, efficiency and stability on the 
part of the mentioned institutions and markets, the latter in turn 
serving as predicates to sound and stable macroeconomic growth 
featuring full employment and low-to-moderate borrowing costs.  
Hence the interest in primary and secondary mortgage markets is an 
  The reasons are 
many.  For one thing, at least until recently these instruments were 
widely and indeed plausibly viewed as safe investments for parties 
seeking relatively modest but reliable returns.  For another thing, 
their popularity itself, stemming both from their safety and from their 
relative novelty in the years immediately following their introduction, 
rendered them higher-return investments for a lengthy period of time 
as accelerating purchases drove up their market prices.  Finally, the 
aforementioned features rendered them particularly popular for 
purposes both of baby boomer pension fund diversification and of 
serving as collateral for burgeoning repo markets.  Hence their 
importance to financial markets and the institutions that operate in 
them.   
 
 14. See, e.g., Hockett I, supra note 2, in support of the claims made in this and the following 
paragraph; see also Hockett II, supra note 2. 
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interest not only in housing, but also in generalized macroeconomic 
health.  It also bears noting that well functioning RMBS markets 
lower borrowing costs for would-be homeowners.15
 
  That was part of 
the point of the Hoover and Roosevelt era innovations to the 
American system of mortgage finance over the course of the 1930s—
the decade that brought us FHA, FHA mortgage insurance, the 30 
year fixed rate mortgage, and the first GSE—Fannie Mae.  This 
system functioned quite well over its first 70 years prior to the bubble, 
converting the nation from one in which fewer than 40 percent of 
households owned their own homes, to one in which nearly 70 
percent did.  We shall accordingly treat restoration of that state of 
health that the mortgage finance industry enjoyed prior to the bubble 
as one possible component of interest II.A.5. 
6.  Maintenance of Traditional State and Local From Federal 
Jurisdiction Over Agency, Commercial, and Real Property Law 
Matters in the U.S.  
The U.S. is a federated republic, comprising multiple states that 
are themselves taken as loci of sovereignty.  Moreover, most U.S. 
states have “home rule” statutes, pursuant to which many spheres of 
authority are formally recognized as properly vesting in municipalities 
whose organs of government are closer, and in consequence more 
immediately responsive to the wishes of their populations.16
This overall scheme of governance, as the U.S. counterpart of the 
familiar European and Roman Law principle of “subsidiarity,” can be 
understood both in political-theoretic and in orthodox economic 
terms.  Politically, it coheres well with the American ideal of popular 
sovereignty, inasmuch as the greater responsiveness thought to inhere 
in smaller units of government is responsiveness to the “will of the 
people” itself.  Economically, subsidiarity figures as an information- 
and agency-cost reducer, precisely by dint of its minimizing the space, 
hence the slack, that might otherwise open between community needs 
on the one hand, the instrumentality charged with satisfying those 
needs on the other hand.  There is, then, a longstanding interest, 
justifiable on multiple grounds, in maintaining the greatest degree of 
state and municipal responsibility for policy-formulation and program 
execution—sometimes lumped together under the rubric of “the 
police power”—as is consistent with federal authority over matters of 
truly national concern.  That is arguably the case, on the 
   
 
 15. For more on matter discussed in this paragraph, see Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian 
Republic by Hamiltonian Means, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45 (2006) [hereinafter Hockett III].  
 16. See, e.g., LYNN BAKER & CLAYTON GILLETTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 36 (2004). 
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aforementioned political-theoretic and economic grounds, in any 
nation.  But it also is legally the case in the U.S., the Constitution of 
which embodies the principle both in its structure and in many of its 
specific provisions.  
 
7.  Maintenance of as Many Homeowners in Their Current Homes as 
is Practicable17
In view of the many costs, traumas, and other harms to 
homeowners, their families, their communities, and the local, state, 
and national economies more generally occasioned by mass 
foreclosure and eviction, there is of course a considerable interest in 
keeping as many willing current home-owners in their homes as is 
possible.  There is documentation aplenty cataloguing the many costs 
in personal suffering, familial instability, interrupted childhood 
education, depressed housing quality and home-values, elevated 
crime rates, and other social ills—including reduced consumer 
demand and consequent economic slump themselves—occasioned by 
widespread housing foreclosure.  There is accordingly a significant 
interest in keeping as many people in their homes, when they wish 
thus to stay, as is practicable.  This interest, however, can rest in some 
tension with some of the other interests catalogued above, in 
particular interests II.A.3. and II.A.4. under some scenarios. 
   
 
B.  CONSTITUENCIES 
1.  Mortgage Lenders/Investors  
Mortgage lenders/investors (“investors”) are one class of 
constituents whose interests are implicated by the ongoing challenges 
in our mortgage markets.  We can partition this class into three 
subclasses, whose interests sometimes diverge, particularly in the 
vicinity of borrower insolvency.  The first subclass is that of first lien 
holders who hold undivided interests in mortgage promissory notes 
and the mortgages that secure them.  The classic, pre-securitization 
era bank or thrift mortgage lender is of this type, a type characterized 
by the one loan, one holder formula.  The loans in such cases are 
often called “portfolio” loans. 
The second subclass of mortgage investor is that of first lien 
holders who hold divided interests in mortgage notes and the 
mortgages that secure them.  The prototypical example is someone 
 
 17. Sometimes Parts II.A.2. and II.A.7. are conjoined, the conjunction being dubbed “stay 
and pay.” 
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who holds interests in a pool of loans, in which others likewise hold 
interests.  The interests in such cases are typically mortgage-backed 
securities (“MBS”), and each mortgage loan underlying the MBS 
issued by a particular pool is held, in effect, by multiple persons.  
Where the MBS is associated with underlying residential real estate, 
it often is called an “RMBS.” 
The third subclass of mortgage investor is that of second lien 
holders, who are able to claim on borrowers only after first lien 
holders have been paid.  For present purposes, it does not matter 
whether the second liens are held in portfolio or securitized form.  
What matters is that the different priorities in bankruptcy enjoyed by 
first and second lien holders underwrite an important potential 
conflict of interest between them. 
 
2.  Mortgagors / Mortgage Borrowers  
Mortgagors/mortgage borrowers (“borrowers”), to whom we will 
sometimes refer as “mortgagors” or “debtors,” are the second class of 
constituents.  Borrowers are those who owe on the promissory notes 
that residential real estate mortgages secure.  While the interests of 
members of this class largely converge, it is helpful to partition this 
class into three subclasses. 
The first subclass of borrowers comprises those who purchased 
their homes during the bubble years and now find their mortgages 
“underwater.”  Having borrowed at fixed rates to purchase homes 
that appreciate or depreciate in value at variable rates, these 
borrowers now find that they owe more than their homes are worth.  
This subclass of borrower is salient for several related reasons.  First, 
underwater mortgages are difficult to refinance in private credit 
markets at lower interest when interest rates fall.  Second, “walk-
away” or “strategic default” is economically rational in respect of 
these mortgages.  Third, many of these mortgagors reasonably feel 
swindled by the unforeseen collapse in real estate markets, over 
which they had no control, and sometimes find “walk-away” not only 
expedient, but just.  Finally, underwater mortgages default at a much 
higher rate than others, meaning that they pose the greatest drag of 
all on recovery in the mortgage markets and the economy at large. 
The second subclass of borrowers comprises those who face 
temporary difficulty in keeping current on mortgage payments owing 
to temporary unemployment or underemployment.  Mortgagors in 
this subclass are faced with foreclosure even when they were model 
borrowers prior to an unemployment or underemployment event, and 
even when they might well be reemployed and well able to resume 
their mortgage payments within as few as, say, 90 or 120 days.  And 
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this is so whether or not the mortgagor in this subclass is obligated on 
an underwater mortgage.  As if all of this were not challenge enough, 
creditors, still spooked in the wake of the crash, hesitate to offer 
bridge loan assistance to borrowers who face it—particularly in view 
of the not-privately-capturable positive externalities it would 
generate.  In this sense there is a classic “missing market” for bridge 
loan assistance, a fact I exploit elsewhere.18
Finally, a third subclass comprises borrowers who would unlikely 
have owned their own homes but for the unusually easy credit 
available during the bubble years.  Many of these borrowers were 
encouraged to aspire to ownership rather than rental precisely 
because home values were rising so quickly that, it was thought, they 
could readily refinance low front-end “teaser rate” mortgage loans on 
the strength of the appreciating collateral, prior to the higher 
“balloon” rates’ kicking in.  Many of these borrowers will likely have 
to return to renting, even if in some cases “renting to own.”  We will 
revisit that prospect below. 
   
 
3.  Mortgage Servicers  
The business of securitized real estate finance in the U.S. has 
featured a well-developed division of labor for several decades.  One 
specialization is the mortgage loan servicers (“servicers”), primarily 
banking institutions, which collect payments from borrowers and 
transfer them to lenders.  Where commercial real estate is financed, 
there are important distinctions between subcategories of servicer, 
particularly among so-called “master,” “primary,” and “special” 
servicers.  In residential real estate finance, by contrast, such further 
differentiation is rare.  We shall see shortly that the lack of such 
distinctions is a pity, and in need of change.  The securitized RMBS 
markets can benefit by replicating certain attributes of the 
commercial mortgage-backed securities (“CMBS”) markets.   
While the paucity of “special” servicers in the residential real 
estate mortgage finance industry is one problem to which we’ll 
attend, another has to do with the technologies that the industry 
employs.  It is difficult to examine the recent dysfunctions that have 
afflicted the foreclosure process over the past several years without 
concluding that the servicing industry’s infrastructure has been better 
suited to environments in which mortgage defaults are rare—as 
indeed they were before 2007—than environments in which they 
occur in abundance.  More of this below. 
 
 18. Sometimes Parts II.A.2. and II.A.7. are conjoined, the conjunction being dubbed “stay 
and pay.” 
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4.  The Federal Government, Principally in the Name of the U.S. 
Citizenry or General Public. 
Insofar as our ongoing mortgage and real estate market slumps, 
and the attendant macroeconomic slump to which they still stand in 
symbiosis, are national problems, one can speak of “the nation” as a 
party in interest.  I shall accordingly sometimes speak of “the Federal 
Government” or “the citizenry” or “general public” as a party in 
interest, and include under this designation various federal agencies 
and instrumentalities as agents—notably the Federal Reserve 
(“Fed”), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), the 
Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”), the mortgage-bundling 
government-sponsored entities (“GSEs”) Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, and the GSEs’ federal overseer known as the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (“FHFA”).  Insofar as the general public or salient 
sectors thereof are faced with collective action challenges, the 
mentioned instrumentalities, including the Federal Government, are 
those collective agents who are best positioned to implement the 
workable solutions I later propose.19
The Federal Government—through the Department of Treasury, 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“FRBNY” or “New York 
Fed”), and the presently government-held GSEs—is also an Investor 
in more or less the Part II.B.1. sense.  One strategy these 
instrumentalities employed to place a bottom beneath plunging MBS 
markets in 2008 was to purchase and hold substantial portfolios of 
MBS.  Even as their primary interests were pro bono publico, I will 
treat these instrumentalities principally as acting in the name of the 
U.S. public. 
 
Other agencies or associated entities of the Federal Government 
that bear responsibility for financial regulation and/or real estate 
matters—for example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(“OCC”), the FDIC, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), the 
FHFA, the GSEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, etc.—likewise bear 
interests that complementary to those of the Federal Government. 
 
5.  State Functionaries, in the Names of Their States 
There is also space for a constituency of state functionaries 
operating in parallel to the Federal Government.  Those functionaries 
 
 19. For more on the need of collective agency to which collective actions give rise, see 
Hockett I, supra note 2; Robert Hockett, Bubbles, Busts, and Blame, 35 CORNELL LAW FORUM 
14 (Cornell Law Sch., Ithaca, N.Y.) Spring 2011. 
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will presumably act in the interests of the citizens of their states.  
While they will not be indifferent to the interests of the nation or to 
the interests of Federal Government functionaries, and vice versa, 
there is nevertheless, some divergence in their interest. 
 
III.  CONVERGENCE AND CONFLICT AMONG 
INTERESTS AND CONSTITUENCIES 
 
We can now provisionally correlate the interests catalogued in 
Part II.A. with the constituencies catalogued in Part II.B.  The 
interests of Investors, Borrowers, and the Federal Government are on 
the whole convergent, with some divergence between first and second 
lien holders among the Investors.20  This cluster of interests 
potentially diverges, on the other hand, from the interests of some 
Servicers21
 
 and, potentially but to lesser degree, some State 
Functionaries. 
A.  INVESTOR INTERESTS 
 
Investors aim to maximize mortgage loan values (II.A.1.)—to 
maximize loans’ or collateral homes’ expected values (“EVs”)—on 
reliable and predictable schedules, via Borrower Repayment (II.A.2.) 
or expeditious foreclosure-and-resale (II.A.3.), at minimal transaction 
cost (II.A.4.).  They also wish to see stable financial markets (II.A.5.).  
Finally, Investors wish to see borrowers stay in their homes (II.A.7.), 
since investors are in the business of lending rather than that of 
maintaining or selling real estate. 
 
B.  BORROWER INTERESTS 
 
Borrowers aim to maximize the mortgage loan value remitted 
(II.A.2.)—to maximize collateral home and loan EVs—on reliable 
and predictable schedules, at minimal transaction cost (II.A.4.).  Also, 
at least ex ante, Borrowers want there to be expeditious foreclosure, 
 
 20. Discussion on some intra-constituency conflicts of interest infra. 
 21. Servicers of securitized residential mortgage loans, at any rate.  Matters are different 
where Servicers of securitized commercial mortgage loans are concerned, in that the “special” 
Servicers in that industry hold interests that complement those of Investors, Borrowers, and the 
Federal Government. 
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collateral-attachment, and collateral-sale procedures in place 
(II.A.3.), in order that real estate markets and home prices, be kept 
stable and interest rates, hence borrowing costs be kept low (II.A.5.).  
Finally, Borrowers wish to be able to remain in their homes rather 
than to be evicted in the event of default or delinquency (II.A.7.). 
 
C.  SERVICER INTERESTS 
 
Servicers aim to maximize servicing revenue, and hence desire to 
keep transaction costs low (II.A.4.).  There are many arrangements 
for Servicers’ compensation.  Currently, such arrangements misalign 
Servicer incentives on the one hand, Investor and Borrower 
incentives on the other.  I shall assess alternative, more incentive-
aligning compensation arrangements below.    
 
D.  THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INTEREST 
 
The U.S. Federal Government aims to maintain healthy financial 
markets and a well functioning macroeconomy (II.A.5.).  To do so, it 
must promote solvency and confidence among the principal mortgage 
market participants—namely, Investors, Borrowers, and 
intermediating institutions—by facilitating the reliable performance 
of mortgage contracts where possible, or maximizing home and 
mortgage loan EVs (including through legitimate foreclosure) where 
full performance is not possible (II.A.1., II.A.2., II.A.3., II.A.4.).  The 
Federal Government also presumably favors the prospect of helping 
borrowers keep their homes in the interest of community and local 
economy (II.A.7.).  Finally, at present, the Federal Government also 
is itself a Lender of Last Resort (“LLR”) “Investor” in the 
(secondary) mortgage markets, with interests that attend that status.22
 
 
E.  STATE FUNCTIONARIES’ INTERESTS 
 
State functionaries aim to maintain as much traditional state 
jurisdiction over agency, commercial, and real property law matters 
as possible (II.A.6.), while presumably also being sympathetic to the 
 
 22. As Investor, while the Federal Government is not solely concerned with its “bottom 
line,” it is not indifferent to it either.  This stance manifests in the current policies of the FHFA 
in preventing the GSEs from offering refinancing options more widely.  See supra note 9, Part 
III.  See also infra, Part IV. 
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interests of maximizing loan or home EV (II.A.1., II.A.2.), 
expeditious foreclosure (II.A.3.), minimizing transaction costs 
(II.A.4.), maintaining health in the financial markets with low-to-
moderate interest rates (II.A.5.), and maintaining as many 
homeowners in their homes (II.A.7.). 
 
IV.  IMPEDIMENTS TO SATISFACTION OF CONVERGENT 
INVESTOR, BORROWER, AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
INTERESTS23
 
 
A broad array of mutually interlocking impediments stand in the 
way of satisfying interests II.A.1. through II.A.5.  I now turn to 
cataloguing them in an intuitively tractable order. 
 
A.  IMPEDIMENTS TO MAXIMIZATION OF MORTGAGE LOAN VALUE 
RECEIVED  
  
 The principal impediment to maximizing mortgage loan value 
received (II.A.1.) appears to be the continuing slump in the real 
estate and broader markets,24 rendering it more difficult for 
Borrowers to stay current on payments, and/or “economically 
irrational,” in the view of some economists, for them to do so.  That is 
the case when home values push houses further “under water.”  
When this happens, some borrowers “walk away” (so-called 
“strategic defaults”) from their mortgage.  Seeing other borrowers 
“walking away” makes walking away all the more thinkable, and less 
shameful.25  The “negative equity” problem is exacerbated by home 
equity lost by Borrowers pursuant to “home equity line of credit” 
(“HELOC”) transactions conducted during the bubble years.26
 
 23. No discussion of impediments to Servicer and State Functionary interests inasmuch as 
these interests do not converge with Federal Government interests. 
  
Furthermore, homes that are abandoned pursuant to “strategic 
defaults” tend to deteriorate rapidly, resulting in more value lost to 
lenders and to the nation’s stock of wealth. 
 24. As I will more fully explain, that causality here is bidirectional.  More on the 
“feedback” structure of slump’s relation to interest II.A.1. presently.  See supra, Introduction. 
 25. Literature on the ethics and economic rationality of “strategic default” has sprouted 
since 2007.  For a well-rounded study of strategic default and negative home equity, see, e.g., 
Christopher L. Foote, Kristopher Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, Negative Equity and Foreclosure 
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston Fed. Gov’t Policy Discussion Papers 08-3, 2008), 
www.bos.frb.org/ economic/ppdp/2008/ppdp0803.pdf. 
 26. See Alpert, Hockett & Roubini, supra note 2, at 25. 
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Partly at the root of the continuing slump in the market are 
factors that impede efficient mortgage loan modifications that can 
maximize the EVs of troubled loans and thus advance loan EV 
maximization (II.A.1. and II.A.2.).  These latter factors underwrite a 
negative symbiosis or “feedback” effect between mortgage market 
slump and loan EV maximization.  Continuing slump is also partly 
rooted in factors that act as direct impediments to satisfying the 
interest of expeditious mortgage foreclosure proceedings (II.A.3.).  
Hence, impediments to satisfying interest II.A.3. also act as 
impediments to satisfying loan EV maximization.  Micro-details of all 
of these mechanisms follow. 
 
1.  Impediments to Efficient EV-Maximizing Mortgage Loan 
Modification 
There appears27
 
 to be a multitude of impediments to efficient 
EV-maximizing mortgage loan modification, each warranting 
separate consideration.  I proceed from structural, contractual, and 
other institutional impediments to more specifically legal 
impediments.  Note that, as I shall find occasion to point out at 
various points as we proceed, empirical study will be needed if we 
wish to determine precisely how significant the actual effects of these 
impediments.   
a.  Inaccessible Information 
Anecdotal reports suggest that one impediment to efficient EV-
maximizing loan modification is rooted in the difficulties Borrowers 
face in determining who bears ultimate authority to renegotiate their 
loan terms.  Possible solutions to this problem are discussed below, 
which include endorsing the Regulation of Mortgage Servicing Act of 
2011, which aims to ensure clarity about such matters, changing the 
mortgage and note recording system, and seeking greater clarity in 
states’ bodies of agency law.   
 
b.  Borrower Humiliation and Demoralization 
Anecdotal reports suggest that defaulting Borrower humiliation 
and demoralization complement the inaccessible information 
problem discussed above.28
 
 27. Because more empirical study is required to determine precisely how significant the 
actual effects of these impediments, we are presently largely confined to identifying tendencies 
rather than measuring effects. 
  Borrowers in insolvency are too ashamed 
 28. See, e.g., Alpert, Hockett & Roubini, supra note 2; Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the 
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or deflated to engage in “proactively” seeking out opportunities to 
modify their loans, and might even fear answering telephone calls 
from what would turn out to be loan-modifying agents after months 
of dunning and badgering from collection agents.  Any solution to the 
information problem may best be complemented by “outreach” 
programs aimed at inducing distressed Borrowers to respond to or 
even “proactively” pursue loan-modification opportunities. 
 
c.  Pooling and Servicing Agreement Restrictions 
The terms of many of the Pooling and Servicing Agreements 
(“PSAs”) pursuant to which private-label residential real estate loans 
are securitized appear to prevent (e.g., via unanimity or supermajority 
voting requirements) loan Servicers from seeking proposed mortgage 
loan modifications.  Further empirical data would be helpful to 
determine whether restructuring restrictions are prevalent and to 
what extent such provisions block efforts toward making EV-
maximizing mortgage modifications.29
 
Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 565, 624 (2009). 
  If the abundant anecdotal and 
 29. There is substantial evidence that modification rates for distressed portfolio loans are 
substantially higher than those for securitized loans, and this may suggest that PSAs present real 
frictions to modification.  See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OFFICE 
OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, MORTGAGE METRIC REPORT FOR THIRD QUARTER 2008 (2009); 
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, 
MORTGAGE METRIC REPORT FOR FOURTH QUARTER 2008 (2009); OFFICE OF THE 
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, MORTGAGE METRICS 
REPORT FOR FIRST QUARTER 2009 (2009).  These and additional reports are available at 
www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/index-mortgage 
- metrics.html. 
 To what extent the differences between portfolio loan and securitized loan modification 
rates are traceable to contract provisions, compensation-based Servicer incentives, or 
coordination problems among creditors remains less than fully determined.  For possible 
explanatory mechanisms and further corroboration of the correlation between securitization 
and nonmodification, see Tomasz Piskorski, Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, Securitization and 
Distressed Loan Negotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis (Chicago Booth 
School of Business Research Paper, No. 09-02, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=1321646. 
A contrary view is found in Manuel Adelino, Kristopher Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, Why 
Don’t Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? Redefaults, Self-Cures, and Securitization 
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Fed. Gov’t Policy Discussion Papers No. 09-4, 2009), available at 
www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/2009/ppdp0904.pdf, which (1) purports to cast doubt on the 
mentioned correlation, and (2) attributes nonmodification primarily to self-cure and redefault 
risk.  See also Christopher L. Foote et al., Reducing Foreclosures (Fed. Reserve Bank of 
Boston, Fed. Gov’t Policy Discussion Papers No. 09-2, 2009), available at www.bos.frb.org/ 
economic/ppdp/ 2009/ppdp0902.pdf, which purports to find inadequate gains to Investors from 
loan modifications a better explanation than contract (PSA) rigidities in accounting for low 
securitized loan modification rates. 
On the frequency with which modification restrictions appear within PSAs, there is thus 
far preliminary and fragmentary data.  See, e.g., John P. Hunt, What Do Subprime 
Securitization Contracts Actually Say About Loan Modification? Preliminary Results and 
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preliminary statistical evidence proves representative, however, these 
restrictions are indeed prevalent.30  Legal factors addressed below 
appear to play a critically important part in prompting PSA terms of 
this sort; the latter are accordingly not apt to be satisfactorily 
addressable absent complementary changes to the former.31
 
 
d.  Servicer Compensation and Incentives 
The PSAs typically lay out the arrangements pursuant to which 
securitized loan Servicers are compensated.32
In the context of residential mortgage Borrower insolvency, 
Servicer compensation is largely independent of loan performance; 
compensation is based on a number of fee-types assessable apart from 
Borrower principal and interest payments.  The upshot is that 
Servicers can actually fare better financially over a twelve-to-eighteen 
month course of drawn-out Borrower default than over a comparable 
period of debt renegotiation, restructuring, and workout.
  At least where it is 
residential rather than commercial real estate loans that are 
securitized, these compensation arrangements do not appear fully to 
align the incentives of generic Servicers—who combine payment 
processing and (rather minimal) loss mitigation functions—on the one 
hand, with the incentives of Investors and Borrowers, on the other 
hand, when a mortgage loan becomes troubled.   
33
Meanwhile, (1) the comparatively low stakes, relative to 
commercial real estate mortgage loans, attached to individual 
residential real estate mortgage loans in securitized mortgage pools, 
(2) wide dispersion among securitized residential mortgage Investors, 
and (3) weak bargaining power on the part of Borrowers, all work 
together to impede spontaneous development of more incentive-
 
 
Implications (Berkley Center for Law, Working paper, 2009), available at  http://papers.ssrn. 
com /sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1369286.  See also Credit Suisse, The Day After Tomorrow: 
Payment Shocks and Loan Modifications (2007). 
 30. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 28.   
 31. A thorough overview of much of the terrain here circa 2009 is Anna Gelpern & Adam 
J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-
Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075 (2009).  See also Alpert, Hockett & Roubini, supra 
note 2. 
 32. Detailed description of these arrangements, as well as of their incentive effects and 
much more on the servicing industry, can be found in Larry Cordell et al., The Incentives of 
Mortgage Servicers: Myths and Realities, Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Divisions 
of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs (Fed. Reserve Board, Wash. D.C., No. 2008-46, 
2008), www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/200846/revision/200846pap.pdf.  See also Alpert, 
Hockett & Roubini, supra note 2; Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 
YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2011). 
 33. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 27.  See also Sarah Bloom Raskin, Putting the Low 
Road Behind Us, Remarks at the Midwinter Housing Finance Conference (Feb. 11, 2011), 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/raskin20110211a.pdf. 
HOCKETTV2 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/31/2013  11:29 PM 
390 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 9:3  
aligning compensation arrangements in the securitized residential real 
estate loan market.34  More quantitative empirical cataloguing of 
prevalent Servicer compensation arrangements, and what causal role 
they are apt to be actually playing in impeding EV-maximizing loan 
modifications, will accordingly be helpful.35
 
 
e.  Creditor Coordination Problems 
The tranching structures of typical private label residential real 
estate loan securitization arrangements often present serious 
structural obstacles to modifying underlying loans.36
At the same time, senior tranches likewise suffer significantly 
when there are substantial repossessions and liquidations of 
mortgaged homes.  Some in the investment banking industry observe 
that lack of movement in the modification “space” might well owe to 
the “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” upshot.  Servicers, per 
this line of thought, just like portfolio loan holders, might simply be 
succumbing to inertia for the benefit of their beneficiaries, who 
remain in “holding patterns” while awaiting and hoping for secular 
change in the market.  If every private actor is thus “waiting,” 
however, no change is apt to come until some collective actor—a 
government instrumentality—breaks the ice. 
  The reason is 
that different tranches stand to benefit or lose under different 
circumstances, such that a given tranche (or more) might fare better 
under non-modification even when all tranches collectively fare 
better under modification.  The most obvious cases are those of junior 
and senior tranches: Absent changes to their pre-modification 
contractual rights, junior tranches are first to take losses in the event 
of modification, while the senior tranches are the last to suffer in the 
absence of modification.  Insofar as PSAs as discussed supra, and/or 
the law (e.g., Trust Indenture Act, more on which infra) confer veto 
authority on each tranche, then, these tranches will bear significant 
hold-up power in preventing EV-maximizing modifications. 
Empirical data on these arrangements is needed to ascertain the 
prevalence and use of such power, and/or the degree to which its very 
 
 34. In the securitized commercial real estate mortgage market, by contrast, the sizes of 
individual loans in the pools appear to have rendered Investors and Borrowers more active in 
negotiating more incentive-aligning Servicer compensation arrangements.  Here securitized 
commercial loan Servicers divide into two specialties—transaction processors and loss 
mitigators, with delinquent loan payments triggering shifts in responsibility from the former to 
the latter.  The latter, in turn, are paid in proportion to restructured loan performance, rather 
than in the form of fees that are independent of such performance. 
 35. For important preliminary work along these lines, see sources cited supra notes 27–31.  
 36. See generally sources cited supra notes 27–31. 
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presence discourages at modification.  The likelihood is already 
apparent. 
 
f.  Bankruptcy Law 
Insofar as PSAs and other factors (e.g., the Trust Indenture Act, 
considered below) impose supermajority creditor voting requirements 
on would-be loan modifications, they confer hold-up power upon 
recalcitrant creditors.  Where this combines with securitized pooling 
arrangements that can produce conflicting interests among distinct 
tranches or classes of creditor in the context of insolvency, it gives rise 
to insurmountable coordination obstacles to loan modification, as 
noted above. 
In many contexts, bankruptcy law operates specifically to 
overcome such obstacles.  Equity trumps law to permit and encourage 
value-maximizing loan restructuring.  Regrettably, while 11 U.S.C. §§ 
1123(b)(5) and 1322(b)(2) authorize Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 
debtors, respectively, to seek modification of creditor claims secured 
by property that does not constitute those debtors’ primary 
residences, no such provisions authorize debtors to seek modification 
of creditor claims that are secured by debtors’ primary residences.37
A simple change to the federal Bankruptcy Code could afford an 
immediate federal solution to the problem of modification-
unavailability, effectively sidestepping any need there may otherwise 
be to address multiple PSAs, Servicer contracts, or relevant state laws 
(more below).  Recent Congressional attempts to take this step—in 
the form of S. 61, the Helping Families Save Their Homes in 
Bankruptcy Act of 2009, and H.R. 225, the Emergency 
Homeownership and Equity Protection Act of 2009—have failed to 
reach the floors for vote. 
  
Indeed, the latter provision prohibits it.  An additional problem here 
is the fact that some states possess “homestead” exemptions of 
portions of home values from loss in bankruptcy (see Part IV.C.1.e.), 
which interact in sometimes unpredictable ways with these provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Code. 
 
 
 
 
 
 37. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 30.  For a proposed “lease swap” solution to the 
problem, see Robert Hockett, How about Lease Swaps as a Mortgage Market Cure?, 
BENZINGA (Oct. 14, 2011), www.benzinga.com/news/11/10/1987688/how-about-home-lease-
swapping-as-a-mortgage-market-cure#.  See also Robert Hockett, Lease Swaps as Mortgage 
Market Cure, DORF ON LAW (Oct. 16, 2011), www.dorfonlaw.org/2011/10/post-by-bob-hockett-
lease-swaps-as.html. 
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g.  “Bankruptcy-Remote” Organizational Forms 
Complementing the Bankruptcy Code’s operation is the fact that 
most entities through which mortgage loans are securitized are 
structured to prevent their filing for bankruptcy.  One way that this is 
affected is by organizing the entities as trusts, which, per 11 U.S.C. § 
109(a), do not count as “persons” eligible to file under the 
Bankruptcy Code.38
A complementary strategy is contractually, e.g., via the PSAs, to 
prohibit the securitization vehicle from voluntarily filing for 
bankruptcy, and likewise to prohibit, through covenants, the parties 
from filing involuntary bankruptcy petitions against the trust.
 
39
In this connection, the “skin in the game” requirements imposed 
under the Dodd-Frank Act could yield a welcome side-benefit where 
bankruptcy-remoteness is concerned: Current securitization vehicles 
are kept clear of the possible financial difficulties of loan originators 
by so-called “true sales,” pursuant to which originators sell the 
entireties of the mortgage loans they sell in order that the latter not 
be counted as assets in originators’ bankrupt estates.  Retention 
requirements will of course render that no longer possible. 
  The 
trust will also be prohibited by contract from engaging in various 
transactions with third parties, of kinds that might enable the third 
party to file involuntary petitions against the trust.  The aim is to keep 
the securitization arrangement “bankruptcy-remote,” one of its 
attractions to creditors. 
 
h.  Trust Indenture Law 
Though the question does not appear to have been litigated, the 
terms of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa-77bbb 
(“TIA”)—which applies to all bonds instruments, including RMBS— 
would seem to require unanimous consent among bondholders before 
rights to receive principal and interest payments on the securities can 
be altered.P40F40P  That would impede modifying the terms of underlying 
mortgage loans, assuming modifications would alter payments into 
the legal entity on whose behalf the Servicer collects on underlying 
mortgages before distributing proceeds to RMBS-holders. This would 
be so even were modifications to underlying loans demonstrably to 
 
 38. There is an exception for “business trusts,” but the Code does not define the term and 
different courts come out differently on what counts as a business trust for Bankruptcy Code 
purposes.  To guard against the possibility that courts may find them to be business trusts, 
securitization vehicles typically employ additional, complementary strategies to ensure 
bankruptcy-remoteness.  For thorough treatment, see Levitin, supra note 27. 
 39. Or, rather than prohibiting the parties from thus filing, the vehicle’s PSA might require 
supermajority voting in favor of such filing. 
 40. See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 27. 
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improve expected EVs.  For the TIA’s requirements are categorical, 
while actually securing the categorically required express unanimity 
among thousands or millions of RMBS holders worldwide so highly 
improbable as to amount to impossibility.   
While it is not clear to what extent, if any, the TIA currently 
figures into the thinking of Servicers and trust administrators 
considering mortgage modifications, given the many more 
conspicuous factors already cited that serve to dissuade modification, 
it surely would present an obstacle were the other obstacles to be 
removed.  It must accordingly be considered when we turn below to 
policy options. 
 
i.  Internal Revenue Code (Prior to 2009) 
Sections 860A through 860G of the Internal Revenue Code 
(“Code”), as interpreted by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) 
under its Revenue Procedures and Treasury Regulations, at least 
until September 2009, conditioned the pass-through tax treatment of 
Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (“REMICs”), which hold 
securitized mortgages, upon strict passivity.  Modifications of 
underlying mortgage loans for their part were treated until recently as 
departures from the required passivity.  Hence, securitized mortgage 
obligations up to that point could be modified only on pain of 
significant back-tax penalty. 
Changes made by the IRS to the text of its Revenue Procedures41 
and Treasury Regulations42
 
 in mid-September of 2009, however, 
which apply retroactively to early 2008, have arguably removed this 
erstwhile impediment to loan modification.  It might nevertheless be 
advisable to attempt to corroborate empirically that these changes are 
having their intended effect.  I can attest on the basis of conversations 
with some acquaintances at upscale Wall Street law firms and 
investment banks, for example, that at least some professionals are 
scratching their heads over how best to synthesize the newly 
introduced language with other language that remains in the 
operative provisions.  Investment bankers of my acquaintance 
maintain vigorously that there must be a complete and unambiguous 
safe harbor where modification is concerned, applying to all REMICs 
to date.  The alternative, they argue, is continuing passivity, which is 
anathema to the maximization of recovery.  
 
 
 
 41. See Rev. Proc. 2009-45, 2009-40 I.R.B. 471. 
 42. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2 (2009). 
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j.  Accounting Standards 
Tax considerations are not the sole considerations that have 
given REMICS reason to eschew loan modification so as to assure 
passivity. The wish to preserve off-balance-sheet status appears to 
continue to operate similarly.43  For a loan originator, who typically 
continues on as a Servicer, to realize a gain on the sale of the loan and 
remove the loan form its balance sheet as it aims to do, the trust to 
which it sells the loan must be “qualified” under the accounting 
standards as promulgated by the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (“FASB”) and employed by the SEC in its regulatory roles.  
That in turn requires that the originator retain no “control” over the 
assets.44
Although (a) the standards do not elaborate on what counts as 
“control,” and (b) some SEC staff have opined that modifications of 
imminently defaulting loans probably would not count as “control” of 
the sort that will shift assets back to originator/Servicer balance 
sheets,
 
45
 
 there is sufficient uncertainty on the matter as to render the 
avoidance of modification prudent in the eyes of cautious 
originator/Servicers.  If and insofar as continuing to allow securitizing 
entities to maintain off-balance-sheet status is thought desirable, then 
(a perhaps dubious proposition in light of recent financial history), it 
might be well advised to alter regulatory regimes that render that 
status contingent upon forms of passivity that preclude EV-enhancing 
modification of underlying mortgage loans.  This point reinforces that 
made just above in Section IV.A.1.i.  It might be that a 
comprehensive safe harbor, where modification is concerned, should 
be made unambiguously available. 
2.  Impediments to Satisfying the Interest of Expeditious Mortgage 
Foreclosure (II.A.3.), In Turn Impedes the Maximization of Loan 
Value Received (II.A.1.) 
Part IV.C., infra, hereby incorporated into this subpart by 
reference, will provide a complete catalogue of impediments to fair, 
efficient, and reliable mortgage foreclosure.  It does so because, per 
Part II.A.3., supra, this is an interest in its own right.  I incorporate it 
here by reference, however, because impediments to its satisfaction 
 
 43. See FASB, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and 
Extinguishments of Liabilities, in Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 140, ¶¶ 8–13 
(2008). 
 44. FASB, supra note 42, ¶¶ 8–13. 
 45. See, e.g., Letter from Christopher Cox, SEC Chairman, to Rep. Barney Frank, 
Chairman of Comm. on Fin. Servs., U.S. House of Representatives (July 24, 2007). 
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also impede satisfaction of interest II.A.1., for reasons suggested 
above.  In order better to picture the many interactions mentioned in 
the Introduction and further discussed herein, please see the 
flowchart in the Appendix. 
 
B.  IMPEDIMENTS TO MAXIMIZATION OF LOAN VALUE REMITTED 
(II.A.2.) 
 
The principal impediments to maximizing mortgage loan value 
remitted (II.A.2.) are the same as those discussed above in 
connection with maximization of loan value received, Part IV.A.  
These are continuing slump in the real estate and broader markets 
and the factors that contribute to that slump, including impediments 
to (1) efficient loan restructuring that could better maximize the EVs 
of troubled loans, and (2) expeditious foreclosure procedures. Steps 
taken to address these impediments will inure to the benefit of 
Borrower and Investor interests, as discussed above in Part III. 
 
C.  IMPEDIMENTS TO THE EXPEDITION OF FAIR, EFFICIENT, AND 
RELIABLE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS (II.A.3.) 
 
There are multiple impediments to the satisfaction of interest 
II.A.3.—expedition of fair, efficient, and reliable foreclosure.  Many 
of these are rooted in complexities, along with attendant uncertainties 
or indeterminacies, as well as inter- or intra-state46
Hence there will be reason to change them.  On the other hand, 
in view of their rootedness in state laws concerning areas of 
traditional state jurisdiction, they are not apt to change quickly.  The 
good news, however, is that, as we shall see, state law also affords 
very promising means of executing the most promising means of 
addressing the more immediate crisis—namely, via municipalities’ 
assembling controlling blocs of mortgage notes through exercise of 
their eminent domain power.  But for purposes of this Subsection we 
confine ourselves to the foreclosure piece of the story.  
 inconsistencies, in 
real property law, commercial law, and related agency law regimes.  
Over the long term, these difficulties would likely keep mortgage 
borrowing costs higher than they need be. 
 
 
 46.  There are pronounced inter-state inconsistencies as well, but it is less clear that these 
cause uncertainty so much as they increase transaction costs.    
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1. Divergent and Complex Property Law Regimes 
Real property laws governing proper mortgage foreclosure and, 
in some cases, deficiency judgment procedures, vary significantly 
among and within states.  Such differences result in increased 
transaction costs (II.A.4.).  Such differences also presumably 
introduce uncertainty among RMBS holders as to which securities are 
best secured, and which are least well secured, by their underlying 
mortgages.  That is particularly so where the mentioned divergences 
are intra- rather than interstate.  Empirical study is needed to show 
the precise extent, if any, to which this form of uncertainty may 
depress RMBS values.47
 
  For now, details of the complexities and 
legal divergences themselves follow. 
a.  “Judicial” Foreclosure Regimes 
About 20 states permit “judicial” foreclosure alone, which 
typically involves time-consuming procedural steps and is often 
appealable.48  In these states, foreclosure can take years to complete.49  
While these procedural steps may be necessary to protect Borrowers 
and keep them in their homes,50 significant variations across and even 
within these states—for example, differences in judicially imposed 
notice periods and evidentiary requirements51
 
—produce uncertainties 
and result in higher transaction costs, as detailed in Part IV.D. 
 
 
 
 47. See infra notes 45–48 and accompanying text, for such work as seems thus far to have 
been done along these lines.  
 48.  Typical judicial foreclosure includes nine basic steps: (1) filing of foreclosure complaint 
and lis pendens notice; (2) service of process on all potentially interested parties, including 
creditors of Mortgagor/Borrower; (3) hearing before judge or chancery master who reports to 
court; (4) entry of judgment or decree; (5) public notice of sale; (6) public foreclosure sale itself, 
conducted by sheriff or functional equivalent; (7) post-sale adjudication of disposition of 
foreclosure sale proceeds; (8) in states that permit, entry of deficiency judgment, should 
proceeds fall short of the debt; (9) in some cases, appeal of judgment.  Time taken can be 
multiple years.  See, e.g., Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The 
Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L. J. 1399 (2004); Karen M. Pence, Foreclosing 
on Opportunity: State Laws and Mortgage Credit (Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve, 
Working Paper No. 2003-16, 2003), www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2003/200316/200316 
pap.pdf. 
 49. See sources cited supra note 47. 
 50. Where EV-maximizing mortgage loan modification is effectively unavailable for the 
reasons laid out supra, Part IV.A, this Borrower interest seems all the more compelling.  Were 
modification more widely available, impediments to efficient foreclosure might be more readily 
deplored. 
 51. See Report of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, 
Application of the Uniform Commercial Code to Selected Issues Relating to Mortgage Notes, 
Nov. 14, 2011, at 13. 
HOCKETTV2 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/31/2013  11:29 PM 
Spring 2013 SIFTING THROUGH THE MORTAGE MESS 397 
b.  “Power of Sale” Regimes 
About 30 states permit “power of sale,” or “nonjudicial,” 
foreclosure instead of or in addition to judicial foreclosure.  Even 
though the processes for power of sale (“POS”) foreclosure generally 
operate substantially more expeditiously than POS’s judicial 
counterpart,52 often requiring less than one year,53 significant 
variations occur across and within states where notice and evidentiary 
requirements are concerned in both judicial and non-judicial 
foreclosure contexts.54
There is also much variation in the degrees, if any, to which 
purchasers in such sales may rely upon presumptions of sale validity 
given trustee representations of compliance with their states’ non-
judicial foreclosure statutes.
 
55
 
  Insofar as these variations are present 
within states, they introduce uncertainties that would seem apt 
adversely to affect the values of mortgage loans and associated 
securities.  Even when these variations are present across rather than 
within states, they occasion transaction costs of the Part II.A.4. 
variety, as discussed infra, Part IV.D. 
c.  “Statutory Redemption” Regimes 
About 22 states—principally but not solely those that require 
judicial foreclosure—afford “statutory redemption” rights upon 
mortgagors and, in some cases, lienholders as well.  These rights 
holders are afforded one year or longer to purchase or repurchase 
title to the property after the foreclosure sale by paying the 
foreclosure purchaser the sale price plus accrued interest and other 
expenses.  This slows foreclosure yet further and represents a 
significant transaction cost—though, like slow foreclosure processes 
where loan modification is effectively unavailable, it offers benefits as 
well.56  Among states that provide for statutory redemption, there is 
significant variation concerning time periods and terms, and this too 
represents a significant transaction cost.57
 
  
 
 
 52. The steps involved typically are (1) filing of public notice of sale by mortgagee/lender or 
a third party (typically a sheriff or trustee), and (2) publicly selling.  Time taken typically ranges 
from six to eight months.  See generally Nelson & Whitman, supra note 47. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Real Property Acts, supra note 51, at 4. 
 55. See id. at 18.  On the matter of benefits, see supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 56. The rationales behind statutory redemption are (1) to afford more opportunity to 
mortgagor/debtors to retain their properties, and (2) to encourage fair pricing of foreclosed 
properties, since low bids are more apt to be successfully redeemed than are high ones. 
 57. See Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Real Property Acts, supra note 51, at 5. 
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d.  “Deficiency Judgment” Regimes 
About 25 states permit post-foreclosure “deficiency judgments” 
against mortgagor/debtors, wherein mortgagee/creditors sue 
mortgagors for the difference, if such there be, between foreclosure 
sale price and outstanding mortgage debt.  There is further variation 
among these states in respect of limitations on deficiency judgments.58
 
     
These laws concerning deficiency judgments affect the degree to 
which creditors can recover in full on the values of their investments 
in the event of default by Borrowers.  Variation in them across states 
of course presents transaction costs of the Part II.A.4. variety, as 
discussed below in Part IV.D. 
e.  “Homestead” Regimes 
Ten or so states have so-called “homestead” laws, which exempt 
primary residences or portions of the value thereof from creditors in 
the event of personal bankruptcy on the part of a homeowner.  
Homestead laws introduce an additional element of uncertainty into 
the foreclosure process. 
 
f.  Undetermined Causal Consequences 
It will be helpful, in the interest of determining to what degree if 
any the Federal Government ought to concern itself with these 
regimes and divergences, to conduct or commission hard empirical 
work that tests for effects they might wreak upon residential real 
estate, mortgage loan, and RMBS prices.  Ideally that work would 
attend not only to the effects wrought by specific state regimes, but 
also to those, if any, wrought specifically by non-uniformity itself 
across and within states.59
 
 58. Some states impose “one action,” or “security first” rules that require that 
mortgagee/creditors foreclose first and sue for deficiency after, while others permit 
mortgagee/creditors to seek satisfaction from mortgagor/debtors’ other assets before 
foreclosure on mortgaged property.  Some states likewise have “fair value” laws which limit 
permitted deficiency judgments to the difference between mortgage debt and the fair value of 
the foreclosed property rather than that between mortgage debt and the realized foreclosure 
sale price.   
  A robust correlation between price-
suppression and non-uniformity would presumably recommend 
greater efforts at harmonization—perhaps up to federalization itself. 
 59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 3.2 (1997) asserts that “legal 
differences from state to state can seriously impede the carrying out of [] business arrangements 
. . . .”  But even assuming that this is true, it is a matter distinct from what effect such 
nonuniformity has on secondary markets once securitization is an accomplished fact.  At least 
one scholar has argued that nonuniformity as such does not generate significant costs.  See 
Michael H. Schill, The Impact of the Capital Markets on Real Estate Law and Practice, 32 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 269, 286–87 (1999). 
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It should be emphasized, however, that non-uniformity as such, 
at least insofar as it occurs across rather than within states, does not 
thus far appear to have been shown to generate significant price-
suppressive effects.  Non-uniformity within states presumably could 
be shown to do so insofar as it amounts to unpredictability.  All forms 
of non-uniformity, in turn, will occasion higher transaction costs, and 
it might accordingly be useful to quantify these with a view to 
informing discussion concerning the costs and benefits of interstate 
non-uniformity. 
We should bear in mind, however, that these are probably best 
viewed as questions for the longer term, given how difficult it would 
be to address these matters of traditional state concern at one fell 
federal swoop.  Although they do presumably bear upon the markets’ 
present valuation of RMBS, in view of the uncertainty they impart to 
attachable collateral value, the very promising “control bloc 
assembly” solutions I shall propose below will very likely moot them 
for present purposes. 
 
2. Divergent and Confusing Commercial Law Regimes 
There is considerable uncertainty within and across states 
concerning who may enforce mortgage-secured promissory notes 
against whom, and accordingly gain title to the mortgage deeds, hence 
the collateral, securing those notes.  There is also confusion 
concerning whether mortgage deeds might be severed from the notes 
they secure in the event that note assignments are not accompanied 
by change-of-lienholder recordings in local property registries.  Both 
sets of confusions appear to have played some role in prompting the 
fabrication of false ex post paper trails of the sort that have figured 
into recent “robo-signing” scandals. Both also occasion transaction 
costs as discussed infra, Part IV.D.  Principal sources of uncertainty 
here are as follows. 
 
a.  Uniform Commercial Code Article 3 
When a residential mortgage-related promissory note qualifies as 
a negotiable instrument, Article 3 specifies who is entitled to enforce 
the note against whom. But there appears to be widespread 
disagreement and confusion both across and even within states, not to 
mention among scholars, as to whether many—or even any—
residential mortgage-related promissory notes meet the criteria of 
negotiability.  When courts do treat such notes as negotiable, they 
appear often simply to assume negotiability or to find it on the basis 
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of quite cursory analysis.60  The reason is twofold: On the one hand, 
the language of Section 3-104(a), which elaborates the criteria of 
negotiability, appears to suggest that some provisos commonly 
attending modern securitizable mortgage notes might disqualify the 
notes as negotiable instruments; on the other hand, the language only 
suggests this rather than actually determining it, so that courts and 
others are left hanging.61
The long term stakes involved in Article 3’s applicability or 
otherwise are high.  For one thing, if a mortgage note is indeed 
negotiable, then the right to enforce that note can be transferred, 
under Article 3, only by physical delivery of the original note.
 
62
 
 60. See, e.g., Dale A. Whitman, How Negotiability Has Fouled Up the Secondary Mortgage 
Market, and What to Do About It, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 737, 755–56 (2010) (finding that, of the 
forty-two reported cases from 1990 to 2010 in which courts made determinations concerning (a) 
mortgage note negotiability or (b) “holder in due course” status which presupposes 
negotiability, only two featured full analysis of negotiability of the note, while thirty-three 
simply assumed negotiability without argument). 
  
Hence, homeowners who have succeeded in defending against 
foreclosure have done so because the foreclosing parties could not 
deliver or show possession of the note upon the homeowners’ 
requests.  And hence, in consequence, the temptation among some 
would-be foreclosers to fabricate false ex post paper trails of the sort 
exposed in the recent “robo-signing” scandals.  For another thing, if 
the note is negotiable, then the “holder in due course” doctrine is 
implicated and can preclude a distressed or defaulting Borrower’s 
from raising an otherwise valid defense of fraud in the origination of 
 61. For example, U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(3) requires that the note “not state any other 
undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to [perform] any act in 
addition to the payment,” and there is much unresolved argument concerning whether some of 
such features of modern mortgage notes as the “written notification of prepayment” 
requirement found in the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac residential mortgage form amounts to 
one of those disqualifying “other undertaking[s] or instruction[s].” 
  Dale A. Whitman & Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and 
Credit Systems, 44 UCLA L. REV. 951, 984–95 (1997) take opposite views on this particular 
example, while both agree that there is no obvious answer and conclude that negotiability is 
accordingly best deemed obsolete and ought be abandoned.  See, e.g., id. at 755.   
 62.  This is the upshot of U.C.C. §§ 3-301 and 3-203(a) read in tandem.  It remains true 
notwithstanding the “lost note” provisions of U.C.C. § 3-309, at least prior to 2002, in that the 
terms of that section imply that the would-be note-enforcer must have been in possession of the 
note at the time that it was lost.  The PEB’s 2002 amendment to § 3-309 rectifies that problem, 
but only ten states have adopted it, and the language of the Section suggests that it is expected 
to be applied in “courts,” hence perhaps not in non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. 
  Those forty states that have not adopted the 2002 amendment to § 3-309 divide over 
whether other UCC provisions, such as § 1-103(b)’s incorporation, inter alia, of all compatible 
general assignment principles of law and equity, or § 3-203’s apparent vesting of all instrument-
transferors’ enforcement rights in transferees, might offer any assistance in “lost note” cases.  
Here is another source of uncertainty.  Even where allowances are made for lost notes, 
compliance with attendant conditions by would-be enforcers entails substantial burdens. 
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the underlying loan.  Again, then, much can ride on the surprisingly 
underdetermined question of mortgage note negotiability. 
Another source of confusion concerning the upshot of Article 3 
is that the concept of “person entitled to enforce” a mortgage-related 
note (also called a “holder”) and that of an “owner” of a mortgage-
related note are distinct even if overlapping concepts implicated by 
the Article, and there appears to be a widespread (not to say 
understandable) tendency to conflate them in light of the terms’ 
rough synonymy per ordinary English usage.   
This can in turn lead to confusion, even in courts, over who has 
standing to foreclose on a mortgage.63  This potential confusion can 
be further compounded by the fact that yet another term relevant to 
Article 3—that of a note’s “bearer,” or person “in possession” of the 
note—is itself distinct from “holder” and “owner” alike, 
notwithstanding, again, all three terms’ rough synonymy in ordinary 
English usage.  Muddying these waters yet further was the practice of 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (“MERS”) in allowing its 
noteholder members to institute foreclosures in its name rather than 
in their own names, labeling MERS a “mortgagee of record.”64
 
 63. See Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Real Property Acts, supra note 51, at 5. 
  These 
confusions present transaction costs and give rise to uncertainties that 
can adversely affect the present values of RMBS and residential real 
estate, since success in foreclosure seems to vary randomly across 
courts rather than systematically across states or not at all.  Thorough 
empirical study and quantification of these effects, if possible, would 
be helpful—though again, the likelihoods seem clear already.  It is 
also worth once again emphasizing, however, that the promise offered 
by “control bloc assembly” solutions to the present crisis that I shall 
emphasize below should enable us to take our time about addressing 
this matter as something for the longer term.  It might also bear 
noting here, both in anticipation of the discussion of policy options 
below and in light of the longer term rather than shorter term 
significance of the subject, that the concept of negotiability itself is 
perhaps best regarded as simply out of place in modern mortgage 
markets.  For the point of negotiability historically was to render 
instruments—principally bank-issued or bank-discounted 
instruments—liquid by assuring prospective bearers of cash-
substitutability.  That is something that simply cannot be expected of 
mortgage notes—issued to banks rather than by banks—whose value 
inevitably rides upon the ever-variable quality of heterogeneous 
underlying loans, collateral, and foreclosure law.  Again, though, 
 64. Id. 
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there will be more to say about all of these matters below as the 
Article turns to proposed solutions to our present problems. 
 
b.  Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 
Irrespective of whether a mortgage related promissory note 
qualifies as a negotiable instrument under Article 3, Article 9 will 
bear implications for any transaction involving that note.  It will do so 
by dint of either or both of two possible characteristics of the 
transaction with which the note is associated: (1) by dint of the note’s 
being issued pursuant to a transaction in which property serves as 
collateral for one party’s (the Borrower’s) obligation; and/or (2) if the 
note comes to be sold (e.g., to a securitizer) then also by dint of that 
sale’s being the sale of a payment right.   
Potential confusion apparently attends this “two track” means of 
falling under Article 9, at least where mortgage-related notes are 
concerned.  For Article 9 employs the same term-of-art, “security 
interest,” in connection with both, thereby inviting conflation.  
Specifically, Article 9 employs the term “security interest” to 
designate both (1) the note-holder’s interest in the collateral securing 
the note—viz., the mortgaged property—and (2) the note-holder’s 
right to regular payment under the note.   
The fact that the same term is employed to designate both a 
primary right (that to payment) and a secondary recourse triggered 
by default on the primary obligation (that to collateral) can foster 
confusion concerning whether payment rights under transferred notes 
can become severed from rights to collateral under mortgages.  Such 
confusion can result in note-holders’ erroneously being thought to 
lack rights to foreclose on property absent physical possession of 
mortgage deeds.  That may in turn afford another incentive for 
fabricating false ex post paper trails of the kind exposed in the “robo-
signing” scandals.65
The fact that both sets of Article-9-cognizable rights go by one 
name (“security interest”) might encourage misperception that they 
are “on the same level,” hence divisible and separately conveyable, 
notwithstanding UCC § 9-203(g)’s provision to the contrary codifying 
  It also occasions possibly price-suppressive 
uncertainties and, transaction costs.   
 
 65. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, Nos. 08 MISC 384283 (KCL), 08 MISC 
386755 (KCL), 2009 WL 3297551, at *11 (Mass. Land Ct. Oct. 14, 2009) (casting doubt on the 
“mortgage follows the note” rule).  Compare, e.g., In re Bird, No. 03-52010-JS, 2007 WL 
2684265, at *2–4 (Bankr. D. Md. Sept. 7, 2007) (“The note and mortgage are inseparable; the 
former as essential, the latter as an incident.  An assignment of the note carries the mortgage 
with it.”). 
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the longstanding common law principle that “the mortgage follows 
the note.”66
 
   
c.  Divergent Agency Law Regimes 
There appears to be considerable variation across and within 
states concerning who may act as an agent on behalf of a mortgage 
loan holder in seeking (1) enforcement of a mortgage related 
promissory note and (2) foreclosure on the mortgage that secures it.  
These differences have especially plagued efforts by MERS to pursue 
foreclosures on behalf of mortgage loan holders who are members of 
the organization.   
The troubles are partly of MERS’s own making, insofar as it 
employed misleading terminology in describing its status in various 
proceedings, as noted above.  But the fact remains that nonuniform 
agency law standards represents a potentially significant source of 
uncertainty where foreclosure, hence the ultimate value of collateral 
and of the loans and RMBS that the collateral effectively secures, are 
concerned.  That uncertainty, and its effect on the mortgage markets 
and mortgage holding institutions that are members of MERS, are on 
vivid display now.   
Non-uniformity also occasions transaction costs and presumably 
accounts at least partly for MERS’s recent legal difficulties 
themselves.  
 
D.  IMPEDIMENTS TO THE MINIMIZATION OF TRANSACTION COSTS 
CAUSED BY MORTGAGE FINANCE, REFINANCE, AND FORECLOSURE 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
Many of the factors discussed above in connection with loan 
value maximization (IV.A.) and expeditious foreclosure (IV.C.) also 
present significant transaction costs of the sort that Investors, 
Borrowers, and presumably the Federal Government would prefer to 
minimize.   Particularly important are the impediments below.  
Insofar as they impede value-maximizing loan modifications the 
parties wish to make, they too represent significant loan-value-
reducing costs: 
 
 
 
 66.  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 63.  The mentioned UCC provision reads: “The 
attachment of a security interest in a right to payment or performance secured by a security 
interest or other lien on personal or real property is also attachment of a security interest in the 
security interest, mortgage, or other lien.”  
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• Informational Barriers to Loan Renegotiation, per Part 
III.A.1.a. 
• Borrower Demoralization Impediments to Loan 
Renegotiation, per Part IV.A.1.b. 
• PSA Restrictions on Loan Modification, per Part IV.A.1.c. 
• PSA-determined Servicer Compensation Arrangements, per 
Part IV.A.1.d. 
• Creditor Coordination Problems, per Part IV.A.1.e. 
• Current Bankruptcy Law, per Part IV.A.1.f. 
• “Bankruptcy-Remoteness” Arrangements, per Part IV.A.1.g. 
• Trust Indenture Law, per Part IV.A.1.h. 
• Internal Revenue Code (until 2009), per Part IV.A.1.i. 
• Accounting Standards, per Part IV.A.1.j. 
• Complex and Divergent Property Law Regimes, per Part 
IV.C.1.  
• Complex and Divergent Commercial Law Regimes, per Part 
IV.C.2. 
• Divergent Agency Law Regimes, per Part IV.C.3. 
 
Note that three of the impediments—Complex and Divergent 
Property Law Regimes; Complex and Divergent Commercial Law 
Regimes; and Divergent Agency Law Regimes—represent significant 
loan-value-reducing costs regardless of whether the divergences are 
inter- or intra-state.  The latter, by introducing unpredictability and 
uncertainty to the pricing of real estate and RMBS, presumably are 
more deleterious than the former.  But both forms of divergence give 
rise to a need on the part of Investors to research greater numbers of 
legal regimes in valuing real estate and RMBS, and accordingly raise 
transaction costs.   
 
E.  IMPEDIMENTS TO MAINTENANCE OF THE HEALTH OF THE U.S. 
AND GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS  (II.A.5.) 
 
The principal impediments to satisfaction of interest II.A.5.—just 
characterized—are the same as those noted above in connection with 
maximization of loan value received (Part IV.A.), maximization of 
loan value remitted (Part IV.B.), expeditious foreclosure proceedings 
(Part IV.C.), and minimization of transaction costs (Part IV.D.).  Any 
steps taken to address these impediments will advance relevant 
Federal Government interests as surely as they will Investor and 
Borrower interests. 
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F.  CHALLENGES TO MAINTENANCE OF AS MUCH TRADITIONAL 
STATE JURISDICTION OVER AGENCY, COMMERCIAL, AND REAL 
PROPERTY LAW MATTERS IN THE U.S. AS IS PRACTICABLE  (II.A.6.) 
 
As this Article takes the point of view of the Federal 
Government, hence of Borrowers and Investors as well, I do not 
attempt here to catalogue all threats to this particular interest 
associated primarily with State Functionaries.  Instead I shall simply 
keep this interest in mind when turning below to various possible 
means of addressing the impediments to Borrower, Investor, and 
Federal Government interests catalogued in the preceding Subparts.  
We now turn to those options. 
 
V.  MEANS OF REMOVING OR DIMINISHING IMPEDIMENTS TO 
SATISFACTION OF CONVERGENT INVESTOR, BORROWER, AND 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INTERESTS 
 
Each impediment discussed above can be addressed by any 
number of means.  The focus here will be on means that (a) look 
realistically attainable and worthy of Federal Government support, 
(b) are conspicuously on offer at present from one quarter or another, 
or (c) both. 
 
A.  MAXIMIZING MORTGAGE LOAN VALUE RECEIVED 
 
As the principal impediment to satisfaction of this interest seems 
to be continuing slump in the real estate and broader markets, one of 
the more direct means of satisfying this interest would seem to be to 
end the mentioned slump.67
 
 67.  See in particular “Pillar 1” of Alpert, Hockett & Roubini, supra note 2, for more on 
how best to design stimulus packages that address slump from the equity side of the debt/equity 
imbalance that is our current debt overhang problem.  See also Robert Hockett, White Paper in 
Support of the Nation Building Here at Home Act of 2012 (Cornell Legal Studies Research 
Paper, Working Paper No. 12-10, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2029239; Robert Hockett & Robert Frank, Public Infrastructure Investment, 
Renewed Growth, and the U.S. Fiscal Position (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper, Working 
Paper No. 2-04, 2012), available at http:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1987656. 
  The Federal Reserve has long been hard 
at work on this score, via both its monetary and quantitative easing 
actions in general and its own MBS-purchases in particular.  
Additional efforts, however, are needed to address the specific 
impediments to loan modification that continue to impede EV-
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maximization, and the specific impediments to the expeditious 
foreclosure proceedings.  I will now address a number of possibilities 
along these lines. 
 
1.  Facilitating Efficient EV-Maximizing Mortgage Loan Modification 
 
a.  More Accessible Information 
One possible means of removing uncertainty concerning who is 
authorized to negotiate modifications is to pass S. 967, the Regulation 
of Mortgage Servicing Act of 2011, as noted above in Part III.A.1.a., 
or some counterpart bill, pending further study of the bill’s 
ramifications. Another measure would be reform of the current 
mortgage and note recording system, ideally in the form of a readily 
accessible and editable electronic registry system—e.g., a fully 
generalized MERS system.  Were such a system to include constant 
real time information concerning who is authorized to negotiate 
modifications on behalf of noteholders, there might be no need of 
further legislation on this particular score.  The Federal Government, 
moreover, could support implementation of some such system at less 
political risk than would like attend support of a particular piece of 
pending legislation.  Finally, it should be noted that neither of these 
measures will prove helpful absent additional measures targeting 
additional impediments that currently complement the informational 
impediment referenced here.  More on those will be discussed below. 
 
b.  Borrower Counseling and Assistance 
“Proactive” Borrower outreach and counseling programs could 
assist the cause of EV-maximizing loan modification by reducing the 
number of troubled Borrowers who are dissuaded from inquiring or 
learning about loan modification opportunities due to feeling 
humiliated and demoralized, particularly after dunning by collection 
agents.  The Federal Government could presumably lend its support 
to such efforts at little to no political risk.  Were the Federal 
Government via the Fed, FHA, Fannie, Freddie, FDIC, or Treasury 
to hold ownership of complete pools of mortgages as considered 
below, it would be particularly well situated actually to engage in such 
outreach itself.  
 
c.  Addressing Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA) Restrictions ; 
in Particular, by Assembling Controlling Blocks of RMBS 
There appear to be three principal potential means of addressing 
current PSA restrictions on modification of underlying securitized 
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mortgage loans.  Each would represent collective means of 
surmounting the current collective action problem that prevents 
measures that stand to benefit all.  One such measure would be the 
highly unlikely measure of cajoling all (or, where applicable, 
supermajorities of all) current holders of each vehicle’s bonds into 
agreeing to modifications of currently underperforming underlying 
mortgage loans.  This prospect is an abstract possibility at best, and 
therefore probably not worthy of further comment.   
Another measure would be for one or more units of government 
to exercise eminent domain power to “take” at fair value all bonds 
necessary to acquiring the necessary contractual authority to approve 
underlying loan modifications in keeping with existing PSAs.  While 
federal action along these lines might appear to have dubious 
precedential or statutory basis,68
 A third option would involve government agencies’ purchasing, 
perhaps via cooperative arrangements among, e.g., the Fed, FHA, 
Fannie, Freddie, FDIC, even Treasury, RMBS on the secondary 
market with a view to assembling such blocks as would enable 
something like the second option noted above to be effected without 
exercise of eminent domain power.  One might even imagine public-
private partnerships along these lines, wherein new, “second order” 
securitization vehicles are formed specifically in order to assemble 
controlling blocks of current RMBS.  Such vehicles also could be 
used, of course, in connection with the second option noted—the 
eminent domain option—as a means of financing.   
 local such action would likely fare 
better.  The reader can expect to see action along these lines in 
future, more on which prospect further below.    
Finally, a somewhat more narrowly targeted variation on this 
third option (“Three Prime”) would be to purchase only those 
particular tranches of particular RMBS that object to modification, 
per Part V.A.1.e, below.  
It is difficult to ascertain the full extent to which measures like 
Option Three or Three Prime are currently being exercised, though 
such efforts definitely have been at least modestly underway.  Since I 
have been advocating that this be done on a grand scale since early 
2008,69
 
 68. See, e.g., Howell E. Jackson, Build a Better Bailout, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 
25, 2008), www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2008/0925/p09s02-coop.html. 
 I cannot but be intrigued by the prospect of seeing more of it 
done.  I still think that it might ultimately be the single most good-
doing measure that the Federal Government and its peer agencies 
might take to establish, at long last, a “floor” beneath still sagging 
residential real estate and RMBS markets.  It would in one stroke 
       69.  See, e.g., Hockett II, supra note 2, at 48 for one more or less fully elaborated rendition.  
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eliminate or sidestep all obstacles to EV-maximizing loan 
modification recalled just above, as well as those to be recalled below.   
The beneficial effects on the markets would likely be so 
pronounced as to preempt any political “backlash” that might 
otherwise be experienced in response to government “activism” in 
this realm.  But there is no denying that it would constitute a “big” 
move, which might accordingly occasion at least some short term 
political expense.  This might ultimately render Option 2—the 
eminent domain option—more workable.  For this option would be 
most likely to be undertaken by municipalities aiming to keep 
families in their homes, hold communities together, maintain 
property values and necessary revenue bases, and stave off the blight 
and high crime rates that attend it.  And action by municipalities and 
states seems to be more acceptable to many who decry federal action. 
 
d.  Reforming Servicer Compensation Arrangements 
As noted above, Part IV.A.1.d., Servicer compensation 
arrangements currently standard in RMBS-associated PSAs fail to 
align Servicer with Borrower and Investor incentives when underlying 
mortgage loans enter the vicinity of insolvency.  Arrangements in the 
securitized commercial real estate (“CMBS”) market, by contrast, do.  
At first blush, at least, it would seem that the Federal Government 
could, at relatively low political risk, lend its name to calls made by 
others for reform of the RMBS servicer market along lines 
characteristic of the CMBS servicer market.   
The Federal Government could also quietly encourage, then to 
endorse, moves by Fannie and Freddie to employ or require such 
arrangements in connection with mortgages or RMBS that they hold.  
Note, however, that anything along these lines would presumably be a 
matter of future, not present, residential real estate securitization 
arrangements.  It would not of itself do anything about our current 
troubles—unless, say, “second order” securitization vehicles were 
formed, after such reform, to act along lines suggested immediately 
above, Part V.A.1.c.  
 
e.  Addressing Creditor Coordination Barriers to Loan Modification 
As noted above, the tranching structures characteristic of typical 
private label residential real estate mortgage loan securitization 
arrangements present serious structural obstacles to modification of 
underlying loans.  One way to address these would be for the Federal 
Government itself, via one or more public agencies and/or private 
sector partners, to purchase controlling blocks of RMBS, per Option 
Three considered supra, Part V.A.1.c.   
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 Another, more narrowly targeted approach, however, would be 
to purchase those tranches of particular RMBS that bear incentives to 
“hold-up” would be loan workouts, per Option Three Prime 
mentioned above in Part V.A.1.c.  Pursuit of this option by coalitions 
of agencies or public/private partnerships might not be unrealistic, 
and would not seem a great leap from what some agencies already are 
doing.  Finally, the Federal Government might also wish, in this 
connection, to get behind efforts at bankruptcy law reform, as 
described next. 
 
f.  Bankruptcy Reform 
As noted above, bankruptcy law is designed specifically to 
overcome creditor coordination problems of the sort just recalled.  
The problem is that the Bankruptcy Code as presently found does not 
permit Borrowers to force residential mortgage loan EV-maximizing 
modifications by filing for bankruptcy, at least not where the 
residences in question are their “primary” residences.  While bills 
have been introduced in both houses of Congress with a view to 
addressing this impediment to loan modification, they have not yet 
gone anywhere.   
The White House, the Federal Reserve, or both lending their 
weight to support of such legislation, but there would likely be some 
reluctance to do so in light of the present political stalemate.  I 
presume that the best answer here rides on (1) how close to 
consideration and passage such legislation might be, relatedly (2) how 
likely it would be that the White House or Fed’s support would tip 
the balance, and (3) how costly to the White House or Fed its support 
for the legislation would be in the event of failure to pass, or perhaps 
even in the event of success in passage.70
 
 
g.  “Bankruptcy-Remoteness” Reform 
A discussed above, most existing securitization vehicles arrange 
in a variety of ways to remain “bankruptcy-remote.”  They do so by 
organizing as trusts, which are not “persons” entitled to file under the 
Bankruptcy Code, and by covenanting out of bankruptcy via their 
PSAs and other contractual arrangements.  Were the Federal 
Government, through one or more of its instrumentalities, to acquire 
full ownership in certain securitized mortgage pools, it could of 
course change these arrangements.   
 
 70.  Passage would quickly result in such salutary effects as to diminish significantly any 
lingering “backlash” against White House or Fed support. 
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But there would be little need, for access to bankruptcy itself 
would be unnecessary in such case, in turn because there would no 
longer be a creditor coordination obstacle to modification of 
underlying loans.  Measures like those considered above at V.A.1.c 
and V.A.1.e., then, would eliminate—or rather, would moot—the 
bankruptcy-remoteness obstacle as readily as they would address or 
sidestep the other obstacles to loan modification considered above 
and below.  
 
h.  Trust Indenture Law Reform 
As noted earlier, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 
77aaa-77bbb (“TIA”) might render loan modification effectively 
impossible by dint of its unanimity requirements.  Such is the case if it 
applies to RMBS—a question that does not appear yet to have been 
litigated.  Were the Federal Government to purchase such RMBS in 
such manner as “bought out” all current holders who might object to 
underlying loan modifications, then it would be positioned to sidestep 
the TIA just as to sidestep existing PSAs as discussed supra, Part 
V.A.1.c.  Absent a bold move of that sort, however, the White House, 
the Fed, or both might wish to propose, or to lend their support to 
others’ such proposals, to amend TIA—at least prospectively.  
 
i.  Internal Revenue Code Reform? 
As discussed above at Part IV.A.1.i., the IRS now understands its 
enabling act in a manner that no longer effectively prohibits loan 
modifications on pain of back-tax penalization.  As also noted there, 
however, there might be some continuing unclarity, and attendant 
risk aversion, where the changes’ precise significance is concerned.  
The White House and other concerned Federal Government parties 
might wish to conduct or support some measure of further study with 
a view to ensuring that no parties who would otherwise engage in 
loan modification efforts are holding off for fear of adverse tax 
consequences.      
 
j.  Accounting Standards Reform? 
As noted above at Part IV.A.1.j., current accounting standards 
condition the off-balance sheet status of mortgage loans, from 
originators’ point of view, upon originators’ relinquishment of 
“control” over the loans that they sell.  For an originator who 
continues on as a Servicer to engage in loan modification 
negotiations, however, might be to exercise “control” in the opposite 
sense, notwithstanding some SEC opinion letters to the contrary.  
Uncertainty about the matter, in any event, might well be dissuading 
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some who would otherwise engage in loan modification negotiations 
from doing so.  The White House or other concerned Federal 
Government parties might, then, wish to propose, or to lend support 
to, efforts by the SEC or others to ensure final clarity on this matter.   
 
2.  Encouraging Expedition of Fair, Efficient, and Reliable 
Foreclosure Proceedings 
 As noted above, impediments to the expedition of fair, efficient, 
and reliable foreclosure proceedings also impede the maximization of 
mortgage loan value received (and remitted), and hence impede 
mortgage loan EV-maximization.  I allude to foreclosure here to 
preserve the structure of this Article, which aims among other things 
to show the interrelations between interests.  For fuller treatment of 
means to address obstacles to satisfaction of this interest, however, 
please see infra, Part IV.C.  
 
B.  MAXIMIZING MORTGAGE LOAN VALUE REMITTED 
 
As noted earlier, the interest of Borrowers in fulfilling their loan 
obligations as best as they can is simply the flip side of the interest of 
Investors in being repaid to the fullest extent possible.  Obstacles to 
the one interest are accordingly obstacles to the other, and measures 
taken to eliminate, diminish, or sidestep those obstacles accordingly 
redound to the interests of Investors and Borrowers alike.  
 
C.  ENCOURAGING EXPEDITION OF FAIR, EFFICIENT, AND 
RELIABLE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS 
 
Because impediments to the expedition of fair, efficient, and 
reliable foreclosure (I.A.C.) where mortgage loans simply cannot be 
repaid or restructured are rooted in complexities, as well as inter- or 
intra-state inconsistencies, in real property law, commercial law, and 
related agency law regimes, means of addressing these obstacles take 
the form of efforts to simplify and harmonize these regimes.  
Efforts to facilitate more smoothly functioning foreclosure 
proceedings probably should be distinctly secondary to efforts aimed 
at facilitating more EV-maximizing loan modification, as discussed 
above through Part IV.A.1.  There is much more value that is apt to 
be salvaged by the latter means, than there is loss apt to be avoided 
by the former means.  Moreover, the Federal Government is much 
more able, by dint of the tools at its disposal, to act to real and 
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salutary effect along lines suggested through Part V.A.1., than it is to 
make much difference to (remarkably slow moving) commercial, local 
real estate, and agency law reform efforts currently underway.  For as 
will emerge below, these latter efforts are not new, and thus far seem 
stalemated in ways that the Federal Government seems unlikely to be 
able to do much to break.  
 
1.  Simplifying and Harmonizing Property Law Regimes? 
As observed above in Part IV.C.1., there are significant cross-
cutting differences among, and even within, states where the real 
property laws governing mortgage foreclosures and, in some cases, 
deficiency judgment procedures are concerned.  Interstate divergence 
presumably increases transaction costs borne by securitized mortgage 
pools that hold mortgages from multiple differing jurisdictions; more 
agents and more legal research is needed in such case to pursue 
foreclosure.  Intrastate divergence likely increases not only 
transaction costs of that sort, but considerable uncertainty as well, in 
that one can no longer reliably predict, in such case, how foreclosure 
and related proceedings will unfold within particular counties or 
courts.   
The transaction costs are regrettable, though not necessarily 
unwarranted insofar as state responsibility for real property law—an 
instance of Interest II.A.6.—has long been a fundamental feature of 
our federalism.  The uncertainty, on the other hand, is not only 
regrettable, but seemingly unwarranted as well; our union is a 
federation of states, not local courts.  It is not clear, however, that the 
Federal Government can, or ought, to do much about these things.   
The Federal Government can justifiably and at relatively little 
political risk lend its moral support and expertise to law-simplification 
and—harmonization efforts initiated by such organizations as the 
American Law Institute (“ALI”) and the Uniform Law Conference 
(“ULC”).  Likewise, the Federal Government could purpose these 
organizations to take up such efforts.  But since these groups have 
long been considered the primary agents in such efforts, a Federal 
Government party would be taking on considerable political risk 
were it to attempt too aggressively to “push” such efforts when these 
organizations are reluctant, or to “end-run” around them when they 
are recalcitrant.  Additionally, a Federal Government party could 
persuade Fannie and Freddie to employ their conditionality leverage 
in the interest of more uniformity in this area.  
These observations seem especially apt in light of two particular 
considerations.  First, law-simplification and law-harmonization 
efforts in the areas now under discussion have been long underway 
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yet do not seem to be making much headway; it is difficult to see how 
the Federal Government might change that.  The second 
consideration is in the nature of a recollection—namely, how readily 
a Federal instrumentality might render the need for law reform less 
pressing in any event, simply by taking measures of the kind 
considered in the previous Subsection in connection with facilitating 
EV-maximizing mortgage loan modifications.   
Since the latter lies more clearly within the Federal Reserve’s 
and other Federal instrumentalities core expertise and the effective 
range of their policy tools, while also apt to preserve the most value, 
and the former is rather more peripheral to these instrumentalities’ 
expertise and ability, while also not very promising as a near-term 
solution, it would seem that the Federal Government would do best 
to focus on Part V.A.1. efforts, while simply endorsing but not 
spending significant resources upon the Section V.C. efforts that I 
now turn to elaborating. 
 
a.  Reforming Judicial Foreclosure Regimes? 
As noted in Part IV.C.1.a., about 20 states permit judicial 
foreclosure alone, which is generally a very time consuming process 
with a good bit of idiosyncratic variation from court to court even 
within states.  As also noted there, however, it isn’t clear that this 
form of process, or that these features of the process, are 
unwarranted in light of the values at stake.  People’s capacity to stay 
in their homes is one such value.  State and perhaps even local 
autonomy in determining how best to vindicate that value is another.   
Finally, process-responsiveness to the idiosyncratic differences 
perhaps likely to be present from foreclosure case to foreclosure case 
might be another such value.  It is not clear to me that there is some 
countervailing value that is so much more pressing than those values, 
and that lies so squarely within the Federal Government’s jurisdiction 
and expertise, as to warrant the Federal Government’s taking a firm 
position in respect of foreclosure processes in the judicial foreclosure 
jurisdictions. 
 
b.  Reforming Nonjudicial Foreclosure Regimes? 
As noted above in Part IV.C.1.b., about 30 states permit “power 
of sale” or “nonjudicial” foreclosure instead of or in addition to 
judicial foreclosure.  While nonjudicial disclosure is generally more 
streamlined and brisk than its judicial counterpart, there is 
nevertheless some variation among and, in some cases, even within 
states where notice and evidentiary requirements, as well as legal 
presumptions, are concerned.   
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The Federal Government could, at little political risk, at least 
encourage efforts to bring greater uniformity in respect of these 
matters within state.  To push for it across states, however, seems to 
implicate the same calculus as that noted in the immediately 
preceding Part, V.C.1.a.  Moreover, the Uniform Law Conference has 
repeatedly promulgated and advocated uniform nonjudicial 
foreclosure acts, all to virtually no avail.  These include the Model 
Power of Sale Foreclosure Act of 1940, which was never adopted by 
so much as a single state, and the Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure 
Act of 2002, which has fared no better.  
 
c.  Taking a Stand on Statutory Redemption Rights? 
As noted above, about 22 states—principally but no solely those 
that employ judicial foreclosure—afford “statutory redemption” 
rights upon mortgagor/debtors and, in some cases, lienholders as well.  
These afford those who have been foreclosed upon the opportunity to 
regain their properties under certain conditions.  Their principal 
effect is to prolong the foreclosure process yet further than as 
described above in Subparts IV.C.1.a. and V.C.1.a., and presumably 
therefore to add an additional degree of uncertainty, via nonfinality, 
as well.  For essentially the same reasons as those adduced in 
connection with judicial foreclosure itself in Part V.C.1.a. above, 
however, this subject does not seem to me something upon which the 
Federal Government would wish to take a position—other than the 
usual endorsement of intra-state consistency so far as possible. 
 
d.  Taking a Stand on Deficiency Judgments? 
As noted above in Part IV.C.1.d., about 25 state permit post-
foreclosure “deficiency judgments” against mortgagor/debtors whose 
foreclosed homes do not bring sufficient revenue to cover the 
entireties of their outstanding obligations to their creditors.  Differing 
states impose differing requirements upon these.  Allowing such 
judgments, of course, tends to be mortgage loan EV-maximizing.  
Differences among states in respect of restrictions upon deficiency 
judgments, for their part, represent higher transaction costs for 
securitization trusts holding mortgage notes relating to properties in 
differing states.  
The Federal Government could advocate for more extensive 
allowance of deficiency judgments across the union, and greater 
uniformity across states where the contours of deficiency judgment 
are concerned.   Yet, for reasons adduced in the immediately 
preceding several Subparts, this does not seem to me an area in which 
the Federal Government should opine.  The issues involved are quite 
sensitive, as well as traditional state concerns.  Meanwhile, more 
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value seems apt to be preserved by means of the sort considered 
above, Section V.A.1., in connection with facilitating mortgage loan 
modification.  And since the latter means seem to be well within 
Federal Government expertise and capacity, they are better avenues 
down which the Federal Government might travel yet further than it 
already has.  
 
2.  Simplifying and Harmonizing Commercial Law Regimes? 
As discussed in Part IV.C.2., the nonuniformity across and within 
states of current commercial law regimes have played some role not 
only in determining bizarre and unpredictable caselaw, but also 
certain practices brought to light in recent “robo-signing” scandals.  
Here, the Federal Government could do some real good, at minimal 
political risk.  This is partly because commercial law is less likely to 
strike citizens viscerally as a province of state law alone; there is, after 
all, a Congressional Commerce Power.  The lower degree of risk here 
also stems from the fact that there seems little to no compelling 
reason for complexity and variety, in the way that there is, to some 
degree, in the case of real estate law.    
 
a.  Uniform Commercial Code Article 3 Reform? 
As noted above at Part IV.C.2.a., considerable confusion attends 
(1) whether modern mortgage-related promissory notes qualify as 
“negotiable” under UCC Article 3 and hence fall within that Article’s 
ambit, and, to somewhat lesser degree (2) who actually has standing 
to enforce an Article 3-cognizable promissory note.  These confusions 
owe partly to (1) less than perfect clarity over precisely what qualifies 
or disqualifies a promissory note as negotiable, and (2) what seems an 
unfortunate tendency on the part of Article 3 to employ terms that 
are more or less synonymous in ordinary English usage—e.g., 
“holder,” “owner,” “bearer”—to designate very different legal 
concepts.    
The stakes involved in the negotiability question are high.  
Negotiable notes are transferrable only by physical delivery, which 
fact accounts for some of the temptations succumbing to which led 
some Servicers into “robo-signing”-type infractions.  Negotiable notes 
also implicate the “holder in due course” doctrine, pursuant to which 
mortgagor/borrowers are left unable to raise origination fraud as a 
defense in foreclosure.    
The mentioned unclarities in connection with which so much is at 
stake seem to be altogether rectifiable problems.  There would not 
seem to be any significant political risk entailed by the Federal 
Government’s lending its support to the cause of bringing greater 
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clarity to Article 3 on the mentioned points.  The recent PEB 
Memorandum on proper understanding of Article 3 is helpful in 
respect of point (2) just above,71
I recommend that the Federal Reserve, in conjunction with ALI 
and the ULC, conduct empirical research of the sort noted to be 
lacking above in Part IV.C.2.a., and act to instigate and further a 
process to revise Article 3.  In addition to attending to points (1) and 
(2), it seems that this process ought also to involve serious 
consideration of (3) whether the concept of negotiability—the 
entailments of which stand in the way of an efficient electronic 
mortgage note transfer system while also risking serious injustice to 
defrauded mortgagor/borrowers—makes sense at all anymore where 
mortgage-related promissory notes are concerned.
 but does not seem to have anything 
to say about point (1).  Moreover, better than a memorandum to 
assist with point (2), it seems to me, would be simplification and 
clarification of the Article itself.   
72
 
 
b.  Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 Reform? 
As noted above in Part IV.C.2.b., all mortgage-related 
promissory notes, as well as their associated mortgages, implicate 
Article 9 of the UCC irrespective of whether they implicate Article 3.  
Because the term “security interest” used in Article 9 refers both to 
the saleable payment right associated with a securitized promissory 
note and to the collateralized property that secures the note 
obligation via the mortgage, confusion plagues many foreclosure 
proceedings.  Some have erroneously come to believe that mortgages 
are severable from their associated notes, and in consequence have 
erroneously come to believe that foreclosure cannot be had absent 
physical possession of a mortgage deed.  That in turn has afforded yet 
another incentive to Servicers to engage in practices of the sort 
brought to light in some of the recent “robo-signing” scandals. 
To solve this problem, all that would need be done is either or 
both (1) to employ different terms of art for rights to payment and 
rights to underlying collateral, rather than employing the term 
“security interest” to designate both; and (2) to add language to the 
text of Article 9 simply stating that in the case of mortgages and 
mortgage-related promissory notes, “the mortgage [does indeed 
always] follow the note,” as has been the case since well before 
 
 71. See supra note 56, and associated text.  
       72.  See supra, Part IV.C.2.a, for more on why it might not.   
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codification of this common law doctrine in the UCC.  Little to no 
political risks are involved in these efforts. 
 
c.  Agency Law Clarification or Reform? 
As noted above in Part IV.C.3., there appears to be considerable 
variation not only across, but also more troublingly within, states 
concerning who may act as an agent on behalf of a mortgage loan 
holder seeking (1) enforcement of a mortgage-related promissory 
note, and (2) foreclosure on the mortgage that secures it.  These 
differences have especially plagued efforts by MERS of late to pursue 
foreclosures on behalf of its members. 
Interstate variation of this sort occasions higher transaction costs, 
but intrastate variation occasions something worse—uncertainty.  
Also, there is no particularly compelling reason for intrastate 
variation on agency in connection with mortgage foreclosure, while 
there is also probably less such reason for interstate variation in this 
field than there is, say, for interstate variation in respect of real 
property law.   
I tentatively conclude that the Federal Reserve, in conjunction 
with the SEC, could encourage and lend its assistance to efforts at 
making incremental reform to the law of agency through the 
Restatement process.  It would not seem difficult to develop a simple 
and uniform standard pursuant to which the conditions that must be 
met for a putative agent to receive actual authority to engage in note-
enforcement and mortgage-foreclosure proceedings on behalf of a 
noteholder were made plain.  
 
D.  LOWERING MORTGAGE FINANCE- REFINANCE- AND 
FORECLOSURE-RELATED TRANSACTION COSTS 
 
As catalogued throughout Part IV.D., the factors that impede the 
interests off maximizing loan value (Interests II.A.1. and II.A.2.) and 
expeditious foreclosure (II.A.3.) also present significant transaction 
costs of the sort that Investors, Borrowers, and presumably the 
Federal Government would prefer to see minimized.  All measures 
considered and recommended above in Sections V.A. and V.C. will 
act to lower these transaction costs too.  Insofar as these are 
significant—a matter that could do with empirical study but also a 
matter in connection with which the probabilities seem obvious—the 
recommended measures look to be all the more forcefully justified.           
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VI.  CONCLUSION: TWO RIDERS ARE APPROACHING, THE 
WIND BEGINS TO HOWL73
 
 
My hope is to have identified literally all factors that presently 
pose substantial threats to the recovery and longer term health of our 
primary and secondary mortgage and residential real estate markets.  
I hope also to have drawn out the way in which many of these factors 
mutually interact and complement one another in challenging the 
mentioned recovery and longer term health.  And, finally, I hope to 
have adequately highlighted the various interests in terms in which 
“recovery” and “health” are best understood, and the various parties 
in interest whose interests and, therefore, incentives are implicated in 
the inquiry. 
The American public has a good deal of work to do if we are to 
bring full recovery and longer term health to the mortgage and real 
estate markets, hence to the broader financial economy and the yet 
broader macroeconomy.  On the other hand, the task need not be as 
daunting as the sheer inclusiveness of the foregoing Parts might seem 
to suggest.  For, in the first place, there is a remarkable degree of 
convergence and mutual complementarity among the particular 
interests and parties in interest that I have identified.  In the second 
place, some of the measures that I have provisionally assessed can 
yield such substantial effects as to render other such measures less 
urgently needed in the short-to-medium terms even if well advised in 
the longer term. 
If there is one family of such measures that “dominates” all 
others in importance, I think that it is that family of measures I 
proposed as the present crisis first grew acute in 2008,74 on the basis 
of things I had written about earlier in the decade in connection with 
the federal home finance innovations pioneered by Presidents 
Hoover and Roosevelt in the 1930s.75
 
 73.  With apologies and thanks again to Mr. Zimmerman.  See supra note 1.  The last line of 
the work in question is “Two riders were approaching, / the wind began to howl.” 
  This is the family of measures 
that address head-on the coordination and collective action problems 
that are (1) diffusely participated market undervaluation of MBS, and 
(2) diffuse creditor incapacity to negotiate all-too necessary principal 
write-downs.  I call these, as noted above, “controlling bloc” 
 74.  See, e.g., Hockett II, supra note 2, as well as sundry OpEds published during the same 
period.  See also Robert Hockett, Treasury’s Planned Bailout is FHA’s Bailiwick, DORF ON 
LAW (Sept. 25, 2008), www.dorfonlaw.org/2008/09/treasurys-planned-bailout-is-fhas.html. 
 75.  See, e.g., Hockett III, supra note 15, at 105–06 (developed, I now feel waves of 
nostalgia in reporting, out of 2001 research paper written for Mike Graetz’s and Jerry Mashaw’s 
Designing Public Institutions course at Yale Law School); Robert Hockett, What Kinds of Stock 
Ownership Plans Should There Be? Of ESOPs, Other SOPs, and “Ownership Societies”, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 865, 924–26 (2007). 
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measures.  They promise to work precisely by dint of their replacing 
collectively diffuse stakeholders, who are subject to all of the 
coordination and collective action challenges discussed above, with 
concentrated collective agents.     
One such measure, as proposed earlier, would involve federal 
agencies’ purchasing controlling blocks of MBS themselves.  That 
would have been particularly well advised in 2008, at the time that I 
advocated it, but could still work now were the appropriate federal 
instrumentalities—be it Congress or, more plausibly right now, the 
FHFA—to recognize the potential and act upon it.   
Another such measure would involve federal or, more likely in 
view of that “collective action problem” which is the U.S. Congress 
itself these days, state or municipal exercises of the eminent domain 
power to the same end.  Municipalities—especially some of those in 
the so-called “sand states” that the bubble and bust hit most 
forcefully—have particularly compelling interests preventing mass 
foreclosure.  For it is difficult to imagine a more calamitous hit to 
their property values, tax bases, and freedom from familial distress, 
blight, and crime, than a concentrated set of local foreclosures.   
If a municipality can condemn physical property to remove 
people from their homes in the name of shopping mall development 
as did the City of New London in Kelo v. City of New London,76
Solution to a collective action problem typically requires a 
collective agent.
 how 
much more apt to pass Due Process muster must it be for a town to 
condemn mortgage-backed promissory notes in the name both of 
keeping people in their homes and maximizing value for the note-
holders themselves?  All that would seem to prevent this right now is 
a want of sufficient imagination and knowledge on the part of those 
collective agents best situated at present to act in the name of us all—
the municipalities.    
77
 
 76.  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489–90 (2005). 
  Only some such agent’s taking charge will enable 
all parties in interest to the many troubled post-bust mortgages out 
there to enjoy the benefits of post-bust EV-maximization.  For the 
time being, the best situated such agents appear to be the 
municipalities.  There, then, is the locus of decision at which I believe 
the next important steps will be taken.  They, along with investors 
who might partner with them in order to provide up-front financing 
for condemnation awards, jointly constitute the “two riders” 
referenced in the caption above.      
 77.  See Hockett II, supra note 2, at 1290–91; Alpert, Hockett & Roubini, supra note 2, at 
6–7.  See also Robert Hockett, How to Bypass the Impasse: Public-Private Partnering for Value-
Salvaging Mortgage Condemnation (working paper) (on file with the author). 
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Indeed, since first drafting this Article, the author has made 
significant headway, in some cases in collaboration with old friends 
and colleagues in the financial services industry, in fostering 
municipal and investor interest in this idea.  Since Reuters first 
reported on the emerging success of the plan in June 2012,78 there has 
been much press and other media coverage.79  There has also been 
much interest shown by municipalities;80 federal instrumentalities 
including the White House, Congress, and multiple regulators;81 
housing and community advocates;82 the ALI;83 the ABA;84
 
 78.  See Tom Braithwaite, Investors Invoke Law to Solve Housing Crisis, FINANCIAL 
TIMES, June 10, 2012, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8017cf44-b309-11e1-83a9-00144feabdc0.html# 
axzz2NvOxlJqq; see also Robert Hockett, A solution for underwater mortgages: Eminent 
domain, REUTERS (June 19, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/ 2012/06/19/a-solution-
for-underwater-mortgages- eminent-domain. 
 the 
 79.  See, e.g., Joe Nocera, Housing’s Last Chance?, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2012, at A21.  For a 
compilation of other media sources, see Articles: News and More, Eminent Domain, 
http://www.eminent-domain.us/index.php/component/content/article/79-publicationscategory/ 
83-newsandmore (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).    
 80.  Id.  See, e.g., Michael Morgan Bolton, Brockton considers plan to seize bad mortgages, 
BOSTON.COM (2013), http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/2013/01/03/brockton-
explore-using-eminent-domain-seize-loans-foreclosure-crisis-city-study-loan-seizures/U1xmw 
Qw706X1VhF1lUHijM/story.html. 
 81. See, e.g., Maxine Waters, The Housing Crisis and Policy Solutions: Should Eminent 
Domain Be Used to Save Underwater Homeowners? (Sept. 11, 2012), available at 
http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/spotlights/upload/Testimony-of-Robert-Hockett-11-Septemb 
er-2012-Third-Round.pdf (testimony of Robert Hockett); Press Release, Rep. Waters Hosts 
Panel on Eminent Domain Proposals to Seize Underwater Mortgages,  (Sept. 11, 2012), 
http://waters.house.gov /news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=308238; Alan Zibel, Eminent 
Domain Furor Hits Capitol Hill, WSJ (Sept. 13, 2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/ 
2012/09/13/eminent-domain-furor-hits-capitol-hill/; Rep. Brad Miller, No Wonder Eminent 
Domain Mortgage Seizures Scare Wall Street, AM. BANKER (July 11, 2012), http://www.amer 
icanbanker.com/bankthink/eminent-domain-mortgage-seizures-terrify-wall-street-1050811-
1.html; Fed. Housing Fin. Agency, FHFA Sends Notice to Federal Register on Use of Eminent 
Domain to Restructure Performing Loans (Aug. 8, 2012), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/ 
webfiles/24143/eminent domainpr8812f.pdf. 
 82.  See, e.g., More from Robert Hockett on Using Eminent Domain to Solve the 
Underwater Mortgage Debt Problem, PUBLIC CITIZEN CONSUMER LAW & POL’Y BLOG (Dec. 
5, 2012), http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2012/12/more-from-robert-hockett-on-using-emi 
nent-domain-to-solve-the-underwater-mortgage-debt-problem.html; AFR Conference: 
Principal Reduction and the Economy TODAY (June 28, 2012), http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/ 
2012/06/afr-conference-principal-reduction-and-the-economy-thursday-june-28/; Community 
Responses to Foreclosure Crisis Conference, http://www.projectnooneleaves.org/content/ 
conference (Mar. 23, 2013). 
 83.  Eminent Domain and Land Valuation Litigation, ALI-CLE.ORG, http://www.ali-
cle.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=courses.course&course_code=CU027 (last visited March 23, 
2013); see also Robert C. Hockett, Paying Paul and Robbing No One: An Eminent Domain 
Solution for Underwater Mortgage Debt That Can Benefit Literally Everyone (Cornell Law 
School: Legal Studies Research Paper Series), available at http://files.ali-cle.org/thumbs/ 
datastorage/skoobesruoc/pdf/CU027_chapter_04_thumb.pdf. 
 84.  ABA Professor’s Corner on Eminent Domain for Mortgage Modifications, LAND USE 
PROF BLOG (Oct. 9, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/land_use/2012/10/aba-professors-
corner-on-eminent-domain-for-mortgage-modifications.html. 
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Federalist Society;85 fellow academics including one of this author’s 
past mentors;86 and other quarters.  There has also, naturally, been 
much attention, most of it hysterical, from the securitization industry 
and its hired attorneys—including one former Solicitor General of the 
United States.87
Time will of course tell how the plan will ultimately fare.  In the 
meanwhile, the surprising degree of attention, both favorable and 
unfavorable, that the plan has drawn is testament to the seriousness 
of the problem it seeks to address.  The sheer complexity of that 
problem, for its part, is what this Article has endeavored to catalogue 
in the interest of ultimately solving. 
  
 
 
 85.  See, e.g., Are There Limits to Mortgage Condemnation?, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, 
http://www.fed-soc.org/events/detail/are-there-limits-to-mortgage-condemnation (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2013).  
 86.  Robert Shiller, Reviving Real Estate Requires Collective Action, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 
2012, at BU6. 
 87.  See, e.g., Memo Questions Legality of California Eminent Domain Proposal, SIFMA 
(July 17, 2012),  http://www.sifma.org/news/news.aspx?id=8589939514; SIFMA and Other 
Associations Submit Comments to the FHFA on the Use of Eminent Domain to Restructure 
Performance Loans, SIFMA (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id= 
8589940214; see also  Robert C. Hockett, SIFMA’s FHFA Letter: More of the Same—and Then 
Some, MORTGAGE RESOLUTION PARTNERS,  http://mortgageresolution.com/hockett-on-sifmas-
fhfa-comment-letter (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (responding to SIFMA’s letter to the FHFA 
questioning the legality of the use of eminent domain to seize mortgage loans). 
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Appendix: Causal (Including “Feedback”) Roles Played by 
Factors Discussed in Article 
 
 
 
Solid arrow lines represent simple causation.  Dotted arrow lines represent additive 
causation.  (Two items linked by dotted arrow add up together to cause next item on right, 
linked-to by solid arrow.)  
 
 
 
 
